This is a first attempt to apply the PSA
model to Chinese higher education (HE). As with all translations, there is room
for revision to achieve greater accuracy and precision. Further, the current
western model dominates our conception of how HE is provided and gives central
place to higher education institutions (HEIs) in the form of colleges and
universities. The PSA model does not and so such preconceptions must be set
aside in order to appreciate the translation.
China and the Western Model
Western HE is in a terrible mess. Taking
the United States as a paradigm,[1] the majority of faculty are employed on a contingent basis.
This catalogue of calamity is found in every western country that provides HE through universities and colleges. In development of its own system, China aspires to emulate this HEI model.[2]
Since the founding of new China in 1949, education at every level has undergone substantial transformation. Literacy rates have risen from 20% to near universal literacy of 99%. At 99.95%, there is now near universal enrollment of school-aged children, while the “ratio of enrollment to graduation at compulsory education level [grades 1-9] reached 94.2%” in 2018. Gross enrollment rates in HE went from as low as 2.7% in 1978 to 45.7% in 2017, with 8.2 million graduates.
To the extent that such numbers provide insight into the strength of a HE system, China remains challenged. In absolute terms China has nearly double the number of HE students that the US has but provides only 60% of the funding and 25% of the degree granting HEIs.
As indicated in Figure 3, China’s public funding for HE has been increasing. So, it is tempting to dismiss these differences as mere growing pains. Similar optimism might repeat itself in developing countries like India, Brazil, and Russia, as they replicate the HEI model. But such optimism is misplaced. When the country emerges from its chrysalis, it will have a HE system that can’t even be supported by leading, first-world economies with far fewer students. There is no desirable future here, only demonstrable failure.
But it doesn’t have to play out this way. If the HEI model is replaced by PSA, the future looks promising.
The Promise of PSA
So, if the current
government funding per student was halved and allocated to teachers, then their
annual income would be ¥286,939. This represents a substantial increase in
income, though exactly how much is difficult to estimate due to a lack of
transparency related to faculty income in China. Based on published research in
2012, Chinese faculty have the lowest entry-level pay and 3rd lowest average pay in the world, with an
average PPP of $720 USD per month, as measured against 28 other countries.
As shown in Figure1, at all US institutions combined, the percentage of instructional
positions that are off the tenure track amounted to 73 percent in 2016, the
latest year for which data are available. For the most part, these are
insecure, unsupported positions with little job security and few protections
for academic freedom. Depending on the institution, contingent faculty can be
known as adjuncts, postdocs, TAs, non-tenure-track faculty, clinical faculty,
part-timers, lecturers, instructors, or non-senate faculty.
Income for approximately 60% of this contingent
faculty is shockingly low. At 2 and 4-year degree granting institutions, their
annual income is estimated at $27,750 and $37,500, respectively.
Student debt is shockingly high. As of 2019, 44.7 million students incurred
debt for postsecondary education that totals $1.5trillion. Equitable, reliable access to HE for both faculty and students is
limited by diminished
and vulnerable funding.
Alongside these more pronounced problems are a
myriad of other satellite troubles such as: the system’s impact on mental health; the quality of education; the ability to start a family, buy a home, get married or save for retirement; the ability to
remain competitive in the global HE sector; or even to afford healthcare, food and shelter.
This catalogue of calamity is found in every western country that provides HE through universities and colleges. In development of its own system, China aspires to emulate this HEI model.[2]
Though China had established a handful of
HEIs by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, after the
founding of New China (1949), in a concerted effort to modernize, the country
overhauled its education system. Having initially adopted the Russian system as
its model, during the post cultural revolution era (1966-76), the country
migrated toward the quasi-western HEI model it uses today. In each iteration,
the system was constructed with elements from the west, forged in the kiln of
China’s own long tradition of HE.[3]
Since the founding of new China in 1949, education at every level has undergone substantial transformation. Literacy rates have risen from 20% to near universal literacy of 99%. At 99.95%, there is now near universal enrollment of school-aged children, while the “ratio of enrollment to graduation at compulsory education level [grades 1-9] reached 94.2%” in 2018. Gross enrollment rates in HE went from as low as 2.7% in 1978 to 45.7% in 2017, with 8.2 million graduates.
China is praised for its progressive
education statistics. Of course, these figures can neither tell the whole story
nor tell the future.
In fact, as a consequence of adopting the
HEI model, China’s HE system is in a comparable state to that of the west – though
perhaps worse, when measured by its scale. There is questionable quality, unequal and limited access, underfunding, poorly paid faculty and staff, fraud,
corruption,
and tension between traditional Chinese and modern western notions of pedagogy,
institutional governance and academic culture.[4]
Many of these challenges are exacerbated by the fact that China doesn’t spend nearly what the US does on education, though it has a much larger student population.
Many of these challenges are exacerbated by the fact that China doesn’t spend nearly what the US does on education, though it has a much larger student population.
Category
|
US
|
China
|
HEIs (all types)
|
7,021
(2016)
|
2,940
(2018)
|
HEIs (degree
granting)
|
4,298
(2018)
|
1,245
(2019)
|
Students (all
levels of education)
|
~77,000,000 (2019)
|
276,000,000
(2018)
|
Students (all
levels of HE)
|
~20,000,000 (2019)
|
38,330,000
(2018)
|
Funding (all
levels of education)
|
$972.9b
(approx. 2018)
|
¥3.699t
(2018) ($528.4b USD)
|
Funding (all
levels of HE)
|
$287.8b
(2018)
|
¥1.2013t
(2018) ($171.6b USD)
|
Table 1
To the extent that such numbers provide insight into the strength of a HE system, China remains challenged. In absolute terms China has nearly double the number of HE students that the US has but provides only 60% of the funding and 25% of the degree granting HEIs.
As indicated in Figure 3, China’s public funding for HE has been increasing. So, it is tempting to dismiss these differences as mere growing pains. Similar optimism might repeat itself in developing countries like India, Brazil, and Russia, as they replicate the HEI model. But such optimism is misplaced. When the country emerges from its chrysalis, it will have a HE system that can’t even be supported by leading, first-world economies with far fewer students. There is no desirable future here, only demonstrable failure.
But it doesn’t have to play out this way. If the HEI model is replaced by PSA, the future looks promising.
The Promise of PSA
I develop and promote the PSA model out of a sense of moral and professional obligation. If education
opens a path to social mobility, then many millions of people around the world are
harmed by the HEI model. They are denied the opportunity to access the material
and personal enrichment that can be derived from HE.
PSA offers correction through financial flexibility.[5] To illustrate this, three finance possibilities will be described, which should be enough to suggest others.
To make the PSA calculations some key national figures from China are required.
PSA offers correction through financial flexibility.[5] To illustrate this, three finance possibilities will be described, which should be enough to suggest others.
To make the PSA calculations some key national figures from China are required.
Category
|
Figure
|
Students in
Degree Granting HEIs
|
|
Full Time Teachers in Degree
Granting HEIs
|
|
Students in
Regular HEIs
|
|
Full Time Teachers in Regular
HEIs
|
|
Funding per
student
|
|
Tuition & Miscellaneous
Fees
|
Table 2 - These figures represent
2019 head counts for full time students and teachers, and per student funding.
The total tuition and miscellaneous fees figure is from 2017.
One PSA possibility asks us to imagine that the
per student government funding, which accounts for 80% of HEI finance, is
reduced by one half. The resulting figure is then multiplied by the number of
students and divided by the number of full-time teachers in degree granting
programs of study. This simple calculation gives us the annual teacher income –
if public funding were apportioned[6] to them rather than HEIs:
A second way to calculate PSA finance is via
undergraduate students attending Regular HEIs of all types, which would result
in teacher annual income of ¥320,489.
The
third finance possibility uses student tuition and miscellaneous fees paid to
HEI, which in 2017 was ¥477.09b. If these fees alone were paid directly to full
time teachers for their professional academic services, this would earn them ¥298,181
per annum.[7]
But how could HE operate with funding
sources allocated to individuals instead of institutions?
The answer is found in the long-established social construct of professional society and practice. In service areas such as law, dentistry, accounting, medicine, engineering, architecture and others, individuals who are members of professional societies open practices to provide their widely sought and valued services. PSA claims the same can and should be true of teachers in HE – whom I will henceforth refer to as, ‘academics.’
Like a lawyer or a physician, academics could open a practice to provide their services - a private academic practice. This is in opposition to the current HEI model, which treats academics as employees of universities and colleges. In this way, PSA recommends an adjustment to academic labour, from dependent employee to independent practitioner, who is a legislatively licensed member of a professional society of academics (PSA).
Under such a labour arrangement, HEIs could operate as vendors that, for a fee, provide professional academic practitioners with facilities and services such as classroom and office space, technology and tech support, or printing and computing services. Alternatively, academics could use off-campus vendors for the facilities and services they need to operate their practice. This might include shared or independent office and teaching facilities, along with computing and communication services, and office management, all secured from private enterprise.
In the end, PSA exposes universities and colleges as expensive, elective middlemen in the provision of HE. To help conceptualize this transformation, Figure 4 illustrates how the HEI model positions universities and colleges as mere facilitators of the academic-student relationship.
The answer is found in the long-established social construct of professional society and practice. In service areas such as law, dentistry, accounting, medicine, engineering, architecture and others, individuals who are members of professional societies open practices to provide their widely sought and valued services. PSA claims the same can and should be true of teachers in HE – whom I will henceforth refer to as, ‘academics.’
Like a lawyer or a physician, academics could open a practice to provide their services - a private academic practice. This is in opposition to the current HEI model, which treats academics as employees of universities and colleges. In this way, PSA recommends an adjustment to academic labour, from dependent employee to independent practitioner, who is a legislatively licensed member of a professional society of academics (PSA).
Under such a labour arrangement, HEIs could operate as vendors that, for a fee, provide professional academic practitioners with facilities and services such as classroom and office space, technology and tech support, or printing and computing services. Alternatively, academics could use off-campus vendors for the facilities and services they need to operate their practice. This might include shared or independent office and teaching facilities, along with computing and communication services, and office management, all secured from private enterprise.
In the end, PSA exposes universities and colleges as expensive, elective middlemen in the provision of HE. To help conceptualize this transformation, Figure 4 illustrates how the HEI model positions universities and colleges as mere facilitators of the academic-student relationship.
In contrast, Figure 5 describes a more
direct academic-student service relationship, without HEI intermediaries – the
sort of service relationship that can be found in dentistry or psychiatry.
An academic who earns around ¥300,000 per annum can operate a private
practice that effectively serves the HE needs of society and generates a
respectable income. Elsewhere, I have provided detailed explanation of the model, along with argument that demonstrates it
is both viable and preferable to the HEI model.
But what can PSA do for China? Among other things, it can:
At perhaps two to three times the average faculty income and at least half the public cost, PSA offers possibility for improvement.
Calculation 1 cuts public expense of per student funding by 50%. This can liberate over ¥335 billion in funding for reallocation to improve research output, primary and secondary education systems or any number of other public commitments such as social assistance for the aged - a growing problem in China. But suppose instead the country maintained its current funding levels. Under PSA, this could result in a doubling of its HE capacity – that is, double its professor and student capacity. In either case, the need for student aid and tuition fees could be reduced or even eliminated.
With this sort financial impact on HE, it is not hard to envision potential for further positive change. Consider the National Higher Education Entrance Exam, commonly known as, gaokao (“highest exam”).
Gaokao substantially determines the future of students - of citizens, of people. The significance it wields affects everyone in the education system and society at large. Administrators feel pressure to ensure that the rank and reputation of their school is positively adjusted based on gaokao results. Congruently, teachers feel pressure to produce expected exam results from students. In both cases, income and career advancement depend on the exam. In concert, students and parents feel pressure to attain good results, sometimes with tragic results. To hint at the negative impact gaokao has on the lives of Chinese, consider that its use occasions: cheating, corruption, imprisonment, depression, suicide, stunted physical growth, superstition, financial hardship, and loss of time for family, leisure, hobby and non-gaokao subject pursuits.
Referred to as a “one-log bridge” (dumuqiao), this mark of modernization and meritorious social advancement has become a contentious fixture of Chinese society. Combined with its secreted mechanism of floating admissions quotas and minimum scores, determined by national, regional and institutional considerations, attempts to rectify the inequity of the gaokao system have been much maligned. Instead of leveling the playing field, there is reason to believe gaokao has exacerbated unequal access to HE.[8] Those that can afford afterschool tutoring for their children, those that live in urban centers, and those that qualify to write an easier version of the exam all enjoy an advantage in access to HE. In fact, the only thing objectively equal about gaokao is its marking.
This directly undermines the Chinese government’s own position on education access.
But what can PSA do for China? Among other things, it can:
1.
Eliminate the need for gaokao.
2.
Eliminate the need for student
aid.
3.
Eliminate the need for tuition
fees.
4.
Increase the number of
teachers.
5.
Increase teacher compensation.
6.
Increase
access to education.
7.
Increase quality of education.
8.
Increase government funded
research.
9.
Reduce the need for private
education.
10.
Reduce the public funding cost
of HE by at least 50%.
11.
Reduce the cost of educational
bureaucracy.
12.
Provide better government
control of the HE system.
At perhaps two to three times the average faculty income and at least half the public cost, PSA offers possibility for improvement.
Calculation 1 cuts public expense of per student funding by 50%. This can liberate over ¥335 billion in funding for reallocation to improve research output, primary and secondary education systems or any number of other public commitments such as social assistance for the aged - a growing problem in China. But suppose instead the country maintained its current funding levels. Under PSA, this could result in a doubling of its HE capacity – that is, double its professor and student capacity. In either case, the need for student aid and tuition fees could be reduced or even eliminated.
With this sort financial impact on HE, it is not hard to envision potential for further positive change. Consider the National Higher Education Entrance Exam, commonly known as, gaokao (“highest exam”).
Gaokao substantially determines the future of students - of citizens, of people. The significance it wields affects everyone in the education system and society at large. Administrators feel pressure to ensure that the rank and reputation of their school is positively adjusted based on gaokao results. Congruently, teachers feel pressure to produce expected exam results from students. In both cases, income and career advancement depend on the exam. In concert, students and parents feel pressure to attain good results, sometimes with tragic results. To hint at the negative impact gaokao has on the lives of Chinese, consider that its use occasions: cheating, corruption, imprisonment, depression, suicide, stunted physical growth, superstition, financial hardship, and loss of time for family, leisure, hobby and non-gaokao subject pursuits.
Referred to as a “one-log bridge” (dumuqiao), this mark of modernization and meritorious social advancement has become a contentious fixture of Chinese society. Combined with its secreted mechanism of floating admissions quotas and minimum scores, determined by national, regional and institutional considerations, attempts to rectify the inequity of the gaokao system have been much maligned. Instead of leveling the playing field, there is reason to believe gaokao has exacerbated unequal access to HE.[8] Those that can afford afterschool tutoring for their children, those that live in urban centers, and those that qualify to write an easier version of the exam all enjoy an advantage in access to HE. In fact, the only thing objectively equal about gaokao is its marking.
This directly undermines the Chinese government’s own position on education access.
Equal access to
education is a major cornerstone of social justice. Equal opportunities hold
the key to equal access to education. The fundamental requirement of education
equity is that all citizens have equal rights to receive education according to law. …To ensure equal access to education is and always has been a government responsibility, but it cannot be done without concerted public efforts. (Pg.8)
As contribution to this effort, PSA can
eliminate the need for gaokao and so goes a long way to ameliorating social,
professional and personal burdens imposed by the exam. As indicated, under PSA,
current government funding is enough to double the capacity of the system,
which opens the bottleneck of HE access caused by insufficient resources and
gaokao pass and HEI acceptance rates that leave many students without HE (see Figure
6).
The opening of access to HE means the selection
function of gaokao is no longer required – a function which offers questionable reliability as a predictor of future contribution from graduates. Anyone who
wants to go to university or college can go. This is not to say that no
selection or sorting tool is needed. It is to say that Chinese society would no
longer be subject to this obnoxious version.
Not only can PSA replace the one-log bridge with an all-access super-highway, it presents an opportunity for better quality education at all levels.
Issued in 2010, China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020) identifies government aims for the transformation of Chinese education, such as:
Despite decades of plans and attempts to change gaokao to meet these reform aspirations, there has been little success. In fact, the latest changes to the exam have arguably made things worse for students by increasing the hours they spend studying and the stress they experience from having to take sections of the exam at separate and multiple times throughout the year.
Eliminating gaokao allows education to transition from knowledge-based, exam-oriented teaching and testing to a more holistic approach, including the introduction of new core and elective subjects, personalized teaching, cognitive and life skills development, and varied forms of student evaluation. In other words, the expressed education reform goals of the Chinese government have a better chance to become reality across the entire education system.[9]
Along with systemic improvement in the quality of education, PSA can improve the integrity of HE. To help ensure both quality and integrity, objective marking is recommended under the PSA model. Professional academics are not permitted to mark and issue grades for course work that contributes to the final score of their students. Instead, all such work is subject to crowd-source evaluation by other qualified members of the professional society of academics. These academics mark work and submit grades, which are averaged for a final grade - all of which is conducted with anonymity among the parties. The presence of objective evaluation is a cornerstone of proper graduate education, where the quality and integrity of MA and PhD credentials are closely guarded.
As things stand now in the HEI model, professors grade their own undergraduate students. To say the least, this is a curious quality assurance strategy. With institutional pressure to not fail too many students, the valuing of research over teaching, and the mutually reinforced view of professors and students that an undergraduate degree is the expected reward for passing gaokao, it should come as no surprise that professors are at least tempted to inflate grades and otherwise undermine the quality and integrity of the system and so the value of its credentials.
It is like asking an employee on an auto assembly line to inspect their own work for quality; though worse, since at least in the auto industry substandard craftsmanship is relatively easy to detect in use of the product. In HE, so long as professors don’t fail too many students, neither their institutional employers nor their students raise concerns about quality or integrity.
Gaming the education system is common everywhere and China is no exception. The objective marking of the PSA model can work to mitigate this problem, under the legislated authority of a professional society that provides administration, supervision and correction throughout the process. A HE system that employs objective marking at all levels – not only the graduate level – is a system that is truly merit-based and can confidently vouch for quality and integrity.
With only some of its virtues discussed here, the PSA model is a substantial improvement over the HEI model. This is true whether the system is western or eastern. But conditions in China present some unique features that can recommend PSA to the country.
Unique Features of China that Favour PSA
Not only can PSA replace the one-log bridge with an all-access super-highway, it presents an opportunity for better quality education at all levels.
Issued in 2010, China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020) identifies government aims for the transformation of Chinese education, such as:
Education should
always be student-oriented, with teachers playing a leading role in order to
mobilize the initiatives of the students. (Pg.7)
Every effort
should be made to improve the students’ capacity to learn, practice and
innovate, teach them knowledge and expertise, help them learn how to use their
hands and minds, how to survive, make a living, and behave themselves, and
enable them to adapt to the society on their own and create a beautiful future.
(Pp. 10-11)
Schools should
reduce students’ schoolwork burdens so as to give students enough time to learn
about the society, think deeply, practice more, and do exercises and amuse
themselves. It is imperative to improve teachers’ professional quality, their
teaching methods and efficiency, while cutting down on homework and classroom
examinations. (Pg.15)
Favourable
conditions shall be furnished to open a variety of elective courses, provide
more choices for students, and set the stage for comprehensive and personalized
student development. …Inquiry learning (or projects), community service and
social practices shall be carried out vigorously. (Pg.16)
It is also
necessary to diversify the modes of education and meet the needs of students
with different potentials. More ways and means for discovering and cultivating
innovative personnel shall be explored. (Pg.16)
Putting a
premium on integrating learning with thinking. We will advocate teaching to be
heuristic, exploratory, discussion-based, and participatory, and help students
learn how to study. We will stimulate student’s curiosity, develop their
interest and hobbies, and foster a fine environment for independent thinking,
exploration and innovation. (Pg.25)
Despite decades of plans and attempts to change gaokao to meet these reform aspirations, there has been little success. In fact, the latest changes to the exam have arguably made things worse for students by increasing the hours they spend studying and the stress they experience from having to take sections of the exam at separate and multiple times throughout the year.
Eliminating gaokao allows education to transition from knowledge-based, exam-oriented teaching and testing to a more holistic approach, including the introduction of new core and elective subjects, personalized teaching, cognitive and life skills development, and varied forms of student evaluation. In other words, the expressed education reform goals of the Chinese government have a better chance to become reality across the entire education system.[9]
Along with systemic improvement in the quality of education, PSA can improve the integrity of HE. To help ensure both quality and integrity, objective marking is recommended under the PSA model. Professional academics are not permitted to mark and issue grades for course work that contributes to the final score of their students. Instead, all such work is subject to crowd-source evaluation by other qualified members of the professional society of academics. These academics mark work and submit grades, which are averaged for a final grade - all of which is conducted with anonymity among the parties. The presence of objective evaluation is a cornerstone of proper graduate education, where the quality and integrity of MA and PhD credentials are closely guarded.
As things stand now in the HEI model, professors grade their own undergraduate students. To say the least, this is a curious quality assurance strategy. With institutional pressure to not fail too many students, the valuing of research over teaching, and the mutually reinforced view of professors and students that an undergraduate degree is the expected reward for passing gaokao, it should come as no surprise that professors are at least tempted to inflate grades and otherwise undermine the quality and integrity of the system and so the value of its credentials.
It is like asking an employee on an auto assembly line to inspect their own work for quality; though worse, since at least in the auto industry substandard craftsmanship is relatively easy to detect in use of the product. In HE, so long as professors don’t fail too many students, neither their institutional employers nor their students raise concerns about quality or integrity.
Gaming the education system is common everywhere and China is no exception. The objective marking of the PSA model can work to mitigate this problem, under the legislated authority of a professional society that provides administration, supervision and correction throughout the process. A HE system that employs objective marking at all levels – not only the graduate level – is a system that is truly merit-based and can confidently vouch for quality and integrity.
With only some of its virtues discussed here, the PSA model is a substantial improvement over the HEI model. This is true whether the system is western or eastern. But conditions in China present some unique features that can recommend PSA to the country.
Unique Features of China that Favour PSA
China is in flux, with directives, laws,
regulations and policy changes frequently announced, covering nearly every
aspect of life, including education. Further, its adoption of western
institutions and ideas has always been adaptive. The country prides itself on
unique Chinese versions of democracy, socialism, capitalism, healthcare and
education. The estimation is that this flux and flexibility – along with other
more specific considerations to follow – might make the prospect of introducing
PSA in China more favourable than in the fossilized HE systems of the west.
Starting with governance, if PSA can eliminate the need for gaokao, then the established bureaucratic and logistic infrastructure of the exam can be dramatically reduced and reallocated to the professional society of the PSA model. Further, if PSA can eliminate the need for HEIs, the accreditation systems China currently uses to oversee quality insurance (not assurance)[10] in HE can likewise be reduced and reallocated. Consider such a conversion through the analogical lens provided by the State Bar of California.
The PSA translation of HE from institutions to individuals (in professional society) can be illustrated by substitution of terms like, ‘attorney’, ‘legal practice/service’, and ‘justice system’, with PSA terms like, ‘academic’, ‘academic practice/service’, and ‘HE system’. Likewise, reference to legal and governance bodies in the text such as, ‘Legislature’ and ‘Senate Committee on Rules’, can be substituted with appropriate Chinese bodies such as the State Council and MOE. This can illustrate the place for government oversight of the professional society of academics.
As of July 2019, the State Bar of California services the general public and over 270,000 members. It accomplishes this with a staff of 583, at an annual expense of $164.1 million USD. Staff to member ratio of the State Bar of California is 1:463. According to 2019 MOE statistics the number of non-teaching personnel in China’s degree granting Regular HEI system totals, 814,791, including administrators, support staff, workers, and other personnel in the system.[11] This makes for a staff to teacher ratio of 1:2. The PSA model suggests that there is plenty of room for reduction of non-teaching personnel and associated costs across the HE system.
Further, there is an evolving rhetoric and experimental practice of decentralized authority in education at all levels – though perhaps less at the HE level. Whatever the motives for promoting this direction in education governance, PSA can assist. The model can provide more effective centralized control while it offers greater diversification and autonomy in the provision of HE.
Presidents of Chinese universities are chosen by government authorities. With State Council approval, the MOE makes appointments for national universities, while provincial and local authorities make presidential appoints at HEIs under their purview. This means there are at least 2,000 such appointments across the country. With this number of appointments, the probability of incompetence and corruption increases. PSA can reduce the incidence of both.
With a professional society (i.e., public corporation) in place, there would be far fewer personnel involved in the oversight of HE. For instance, there might be the national professional society and a number of regional chapters. This makes for streamlined and centralized, top-level HE authority, which offers more efficient and reliable oversight. All interaction between the HE system and the various levels of government is managed through a nominal number of intermediaries at the head of professional society organization. This simplifies communications, reduces personality conflicts, minimizes politicking, facilitates better execution of government directives, enables better cooperation and coordination across the HE system, and makes incompetence and corruption easier to expose.
Since PSA is a legislated, self-policing association of academics using objective evaluation, there would also not be a need for accreditation boards and other bodies responsible for HE quality insurance and assurance. At the same time, the developed infrastructure and decades of knowledge gained from gaokao and accreditation can be used to develop the objective evaluation recommended by PSA, as administered under the protection and direction of its professional society. In this way, PSA removes another potential source of incompetent or corruptive oversight. Properly overseen, structured and operated, a professional society of academics can ensure the quality and integrity of the HE system.
Along with a system of objective evaluation, another function of the professional society related to quality and integrity is to publish the service records of its academic members. These records include information such as: 1) pass/fail ratios; 2) student evaluations of service; 3) disciplinary actions taken by the professional society; 4) criminal records; 4) qualifications; 5) awards; 6) research record; 7) years of service; 8) number and level of students serviced; 9) types of professional development; and any other data deemed useful to the public in making an informed decision regarding selection of an education service provider.
One might think of this PSA publication as a guide similar to the Regular HEI Application Guidebook (全国普通高校报考指南) offered to students upon completion of the gaokao. This guide is meant to help students select the HEI they want to apply to, within the allowances of their personal exam score, the floating admission quotas and minimum exam scores of HEIs. As a catalogue that essentially advertises various features of HEIs, the application guidebook includes information such as: institutional history, admission requirements, tuition, scholarship, and admission quotas. Since HEIs are subordinate in the PSA model, its version of an application guidebook would be confined to individual academic practitioners and would include some of the same information (e.g., admission requirements and quotas), but also much more of value related to the type and quality of service offered by academic practices – by teachers.
The publicity of this sort information not only enables students to effectively select academics they hope to study with, it also encourages academics to provide good service. If an academic has a poor public record and is unable to attract students, then this might directly affect personal income. This might encourage professional development that improves their service and public record. Or, it might encourage an exit from the profession. In either case, society gets better educators and so better education.[12]
Chinese HE has a long history of individual, not institutional, tutelage. Like the west, formal education in China began with an intimate relationship between sage and student, outside of state authority or support. Confucius established his private academy in an attempt to prepare future leaders of a society he envisioned in his philosophy. Eventually, his teachings were officially adopted by the state during the Han Dynasty (156 BCE-87 BCE) and ultimately formed the curriculum of imperial civil service exams (keju) under the Sui Dynasty (581 CE-619 CE).[13]
But from the time of Confucius to the present, private tutors have instructed students outside the official state academies and institutions of higher learning. Today, seeking a tutor has become a familiar undertaking for parents and students, with 60% of parents enrolling their children in some form of private tutoring (a.k.a, “shadow education”).
As such, PSA models this tradition, as it does the true spirit of a universitas found in the first western university, the University of Bologna (1088 CE). With the inclusion of a professional service record, the model aims to arm parents and students for better participation in this tradition of selecting individual academics for their educational services in the public system of HE.
Finally, as mentioned above, China’s government has made and continues to make policy overtures that invite participation in the process of education reform. If we filter out language that refers to the institutional provision of education (i.e., the HEI model) and focus is placed solely on the education goals, then PSA can offer valuable contribution.
The one reference to institutions that is retained is meant to emphasize that colleges and universities do indeed pose impediments that can be overcome by PSA so that these broad educational and governance reform goals can be realized.
As indicated, this translation is initial and evolving. With greater details to come, this present form only scratches the surface of benefits PSA can offer Chinese HE. As always, I invite input and collaboration, but especially in this case, since I am nothing like an authority on Chinese culture and education. In particular, two aspects of this translation that call out for input are: 1) data for HE faculty income and 2) data on the public expense of the gaokao exam. This information has proven difficult to collect and is vital to a more complete application of the PSA model in China.
Starting with governance, if PSA can eliminate the need for gaokao, then the established bureaucratic and logistic infrastructure of the exam can be dramatically reduced and reallocated to the professional society of the PSA model. Further, if PSA can eliminate the need for HEIs, the accreditation systems China currently uses to oversee quality insurance (not assurance)[10] in HE can likewise be reduced and reallocated. Consider such a conversion through the analogical lens provided by the State Bar of California.
The State Bar of California (“State Bar”) is a public corporation established
by the California Legislature on July 29, 1927. In 1960, a constitutional
amendment was approved, which added the State Bar as a constitutional agency in
the judicial branch of government. Licensing by the State Bar is required in
order to practice law in the State of California (“State”). The State Bar’s
activities relate primarily to admission, discipline, and regulation of
attorneys, and to other programs that enhance lawyer ethics and competence or
improve the quality of legal service and the justice system. The State Bar has
engaged in such functions as administering the bar examination, formulating
rules of professional conduct, disciplining licensees for misconduct,
administering mandated continuing legal education requirements, administering
other regulatory provisions affecting the profession or the practice of law,
studying and recommending changes in legislation, cooperating with the Judicial
Council, and providing various licensee services. The State Bar is governed by
a 13-member Board of Trustees. Five attorneys are appointed by the California
Supreme Court and serve four-year terms. Two attorneys are appointed by the
Legislature, one by the Senate Committee on Rules and one by the Speaker of the
Assembly. Six “public” or non-attorney members also serve. Four appointed by
the Governor, and one by the Senate Committee on Rules and one by the Speaker
of the Assembly. The Board is charged with the executive functions of the State
Bar. Among other things it has the responsibility for fiscal policy, exercising
contractual powers and administering the affairs of the State Bar through its
chosen Executive Director. (Pg. 17)
The PSA translation of HE from institutions to individuals (in professional society) can be illustrated by substitution of terms like, ‘attorney’, ‘legal practice/service’, and ‘justice system’, with PSA terms like, ‘academic’, ‘academic practice/service’, and ‘HE system’. Likewise, reference to legal and governance bodies in the text such as, ‘Legislature’ and ‘Senate Committee on Rules’, can be substituted with appropriate Chinese bodies such as the State Council and MOE. This can illustrate the place for government oversight of the professional society of academics.
As of July 2019, the State Bar of California services the general public and over 270,000 members. It accomplishes this with a staff of 583, at an annual expense of $164.1 million USD. Staff to member ratio of the State Bar of California is 1:463. According to 2019 MOE statistics the number of non-teaching personnel in China’s degree granting Regular HEI system totals, 814,791, including administrators, support staff, workers, and other personnel in the system.[11] This makes for a staff to teacher ratio of 1:2. The PSA model suggests that there is plenty of room for reduction of non-teaching personnel and associated costs across the HE system.
Further, there is an evolving rhetoric and experimental practice of decentralized authority in education at all levels – though perhaps less at the HE level. Whatever the motives for promoting this direction in education governance, PSA can assist. The model can provide more effective centralized control while it offers greater diversification and autonomy in the provision of HE.
Presidents of Chinese universities are chosen by government authorities. With State Council approval, the MOE makes appointments for national universities, while provincial and local authorities make presidential appoints at HEIs under their purview. This means there are at least 2,000 such appointments across the country. With this number of appointments, the probability of incompetence and corruption increases. PSA can reduce the incidence of both.
With a professional society (i.e., public corporation) in place, there would be far fewer personnel involved in the oversight of HE. For instance, there might be the national professional society and a number of regional chapters. This makes for streamlined and centralized, top-level HE authority, which offers more efficient and reliable oversight. All interaction between the HE system and the various levels of government is managed through a nominal number of intermediaries at the head of professional society organization. This simplifies communications, reduces personality conflicts, minimizes politicking, facilitates better execution of government directives, enables better cooperation and coordination across the HE system, and makes incompetence and corruption easier to expose.
Since PSA is a legislated, self-policing association of academics using objective evaluation, there would also not be a need for accreditation boards and other bodies responsible for HE quality insurance and assurance. At the same time, the developed infrastructure and decades of knowledge gained from gaokao and accreditation can be used to develop the objective evaluation recommended by PSA, as administered under the protection and direction of its professional society. In this way, PSA removes another potential source of incompetent or corruptive oversight. Properly overseen, structured and operated, a professional society of academics can ensure the quality and integrity of the HE system.
Along with a system of objective evaluation, another function of the professional society related to quality and integrity is to publish the service records of its academic members. These records include information such as: 1) pass/fail ratios; 2) student evaluations of service; 3) disciplinary actions taken by the professional society; 4) criminal records; 4) qualifications; 5) awards; 6) research record; 7) years of service; 8) number and level of students serviced; 9) types of professional development; and any other data deemed useful to the public in making an informed decision regarding selection of an education service provider.
One might think of this PSA publication as a guide similar to the Regular HEI Application Guidebook (全国普通高校报考指南) offered to students upon completion of the gaokao. This guide is meant to help students select the HEI they want to apply to, within the allowances of their personal exam score, the floating admission quotas and minimum exam scores of HEIs. As a catalogue that essentially advertises various features of HEIs, the application guidebook includes information such as: institutional history, admission requirements, tuition, scholarship, and admission quotas. Since HEIs are subordinate in the PSA model, its version of an application guidebook would be confined to individual academic practitioners and would include some of the same information (e.g., admission requirements and quotas), but also much more of value related to the type and quality of service offered by academic practices – by teachers.
The publicity of this sort information not only enables students to effectively select academics they hope to study with, it also encourages academics to provide good service. If an academic has a poor public record and is unable to attract students, then this might directly affect personal income. This might encourage professional development that improves their service and public record. Or, it might encourage an exit from the profession. In either case, society gets better educators and so better education.[12]
Chinese HE has a long history of individual, not institutional, tutelage. Like the west, formal education in China began with an intimate relationship between sage and student, outside of state authority or support. Confucius established his private academy in an attempt to prepare future leaders of a society he envisioned in his philosophy. Eventually, his teachings were officially adopted by the state during the Han Dynasty (156 BCE-87 BCE) and ultimately formed the curriculum of imperial civil service exams (keju) under the Sui Dynasty (581 CE-619 CE).[13]
But from the time of Confucius to the present, private tutors have instructed students outside the official state academies and institutions of higher learning. Today, seeking a tutor has become a familiar undertaking for parents and students, with 60% of parents enrolling their children in some form of private tutoring (a.k.a, “shadow education”).
As such, PSA models this tradition, as it does the true spirit of a universitas found in the first western university, the University of Bologna (1088 CE). With the inclusion of a professional service record, the model aims to arm parents and students for better participation in this tradition of selecting individual academics for their educational services in the public system of HE.
Finally, as mentioned above, China’s government has made and continues to make policy overtures that invite participation in the process of education reform. If we filter out language that refers to the institutional provision of education (i.e., the HEI model) and focus is placed solely on the education goals, then PSA can offer valuable contribution.
Reform is pivotal to education development. Localities … should be encouraged to
explore and conduct experiments, … to speed up reforms in key areas. It is
imperative to renovate talent or professional cultivation, … education
administration, overhaul quality evaluation, examination and enrollment, revamp
teaching contents, methods and approaches, and put a modern … system in place.
The conflicts between the need of economic and social development for
diversified quality talents or professionals and the incapacities to produce
adequate talents or professionals, between the public’s longing for better
education and the relative shortage in education resources, and between the
need to invigorate education and the institutional impediments to it
should be addressed, in order to fuel sustainable and healthy education
development. (Italic emphasis added) (Pg.8)
The one reference to institutions that is retained is meant to emphasize that colleges and universities do indeed pose impediments that can be overcome by PSA so that these broad educational and governance reform goals can be realized.
As indicated, this translation is initial and evolving. With greater details to come, this present form only scratches the surface of benefits PSA can offer Chinese HE. As always, I invite input and collaboration, but especially in this case, since I am nothing like an authority on Chinese culture and education. In particular, two aspects of this translation that call out for input are: 1) data for HE faculty income and 2) data on the public expense of the gaokao exam. This information has proven difficult to collect and is vital to a more complete application of the PSA model in China.
1. The US is chosen because its HE system is iconic of both the HEI
model and its shortcomings, as found in other western countries. It is (or was)
also considered one of the best funded and highest quality systems in the
world.
7. Without further specificity offered by the government, it is
assumed that this tuition and miscellaneous fees figure is a total for all
levels and types of HE, including adult HE, vocational colleges, regular HEIs,
etc. At the same time, these fees at adult HEIs are nominal, compared to those
at regular HEIs. Consequently, the lion’s share of this tuition and
miscellaneous fees figure comes from the target of this paper – degree granting
and regular HEI education. In the end, it is conceivable that the annual
salaries might be slightly lower. The income would also be slightly lower if
part time teachers (505,181 (2019)) were folded into the calculation (measured
as fulltime equivalent faculty – 168,393 FTE).
8. Jing, Xiaoyan and Liu, Li. “The Equity of Gaokao (National University/College Entrance Examination) in China.” Review of Education Journal, vol. 2, Issue 3, 2019, pp. 29-349. In fact, the PSA model can be employed at all levels of education, with similar favorable benefits to those it offers HE.
2. The ultimate direction in which China intends to take its evolving
HE system is a matter of some speculation. At the moment, the system is an
attempt to marry western and eastern features of HE and wider cultural values.
So far, the marriage arrangements are being negotiated. Historically, China has
adopted a very practical attitude toward the function and value of HE.
Currently, a central purpose is to create a group of world-class universities –
the so-called, Double First-Class Initiative. Though Beijing has announced its
commitment to greater, more equitable access to HE, how this is realized
depends on its interpretation of the key terms. It is quite conceivable that a
fleet of flagship institutions is its endgame, while the masses are taught
using the fast-evolving AI technology the country is developing. There are, of
course, several other possibilities. The aim of this paper is to present yet
another contender for the future model of Chinese HE.
3. Yang, R. “Reassessing China’s Higher Education Development: A Focus
on Academic Culture.” Asia Pacific Education Review, v. 16 n. 4, 2015,
p. 527-535
4. Yang, R. “Reassessing China’s Higher Education Development: A Focus
on Academic Culture.” Asia Pacific Education Review, v. 16 n. 4, 2015,
p. 527-535
5. It
is important to note that these finance figures might not include all the
revenue HE receives from all its sources. Due to a lack of detailed
transparency in China’s system of budget reporting, it is not known whether the
per student funding of ¥36,294 represents only the funding directly related
to the provision of education or whether it includes student aid, capital construction,
research funding and educational surcharges. Further, due to the lack of
detailed transparency, it is assumed that the ¥36,294 figure is an average
across all types of HE and HEIs – from adult colleges to research universities.
Since this analysis focuses only on Regular and Degree Granting HEIs, it is
reasonable to expect the per student funding rate is in fact higher for these
types of HE. The upshot of all this is that the cost reduction PSA offers is
potentially larger than what is calculated in the present work. Finally, it is
assumed that the per student funding does not include revenue from sales of goods and
services or private donations.
6. Precisely how these funds are apportioned to teachers (under the
PSA model) is an important, but open question. Perhaps a voucher system is
appropriate. Perhaps the government pays teachers directly based on the number
of students they teach or a flat rate regardless of the number. There could
also be a performance-based component to compensation. Still, other methods can
be conceived.
8. Jing, Xiaoyan and Liu, Li. “The Equity of Gaokao (National University/College Entrance Examination) in China.” Review of Education Journal, vol. 2, Issue 3, 2019, pp. 29-349. In fact, the PSA model can be employed at all levels of education, with similar favorable benefits to those it offers HE.
10 Quality insurance is a measure of the inputs of a system. While
quality assurance is a measure of outputs. In this way, accreditation bodies
primarily measure system inputs such as HEI infrastructure and equipment,
faculty credentials, support staff composition, and funding (allocation), but
not student learning outcomes connected to quality of education.
11. These figures are only for personnel in the Regular HEI system. So,
it does not include the bureaucracy found in the MOE or departments of
education at all levels of government, nor the personnel involved in the gaokao
and accreditation.
12. This does not nearly
tell the whole story as conceived under PSA. For instance, data on the students
to whom academics provide service is also publicized. This allows for a
complete picture of the academic’s record. For instance, one should expect that
an academic who services relatively poor students will likely have a less
impressive record than academics that service the top students in the country.
At the same time, a relatively impressive record from an academic who services
relatively poor students is quite impressive.
13. Wu, Hantian and Zha, Qiang. “History of Chinese Education.” Encyclopedia
of Educational Philosophy and Theory, edited by M. A. Petters, Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd., 2018, pp. 1-7.
No comments:
Post a Comment