Moral Responsibility
Behaviour considered normative
in nature is bound by the familiar Kantian paraphrase, "ought implies can." Proper analysis of the phrase depends on the
meaning given to "can" and related notions of possibility, but on one
interpretation: if an agent’s behaviour is unavoidable, if there is no possible
alternative, then there is no moral traffic.
This is a logical point that partially
scribes the domain of ethical theory.
Of course what is “avoidable”
or “possible” in terms of moral agency is complex, involving factors from individual
psychology to independent states of the world. For instance, behaviour that is symptomatic of mental disease is not immediately
ethical but clinical in nature and so the proper subject matter of neuropsychology. Diseased behaviour, like diseased tissue, is
strictly speaking open to descriptive and not normative analysis.
As such, individuals
afflicted with paranoid schizophrenia are not morally responsible for symptomatic
behaviour and its fallout. There is no
question of what they ought to do during psychotic episodes, because there is
nothing they can otherwise do.
Or consider a pair of friends
hiking the hills where one sustains an accidental, fatal injury and the other
lacks specialized medical knowledge necessary to save the party. There might be issues of moral
responsibility, but in this circumstance the failure of the individual to take
action that can save their friend is not among them.
No such action was possible and
so there is no basis for ethical assessment, including assignment of blame or
praise. One ought to save the life of one’s
friend, but no one is obliged to do the impossible.
Be it an act of commission or
omission, if there is no possible alternative, then there is no question as to
what ought to be done and so no opportunity to condemn or condone. It is this observation that fundamentally and
largely releases the current higher education paradigm from moral responsibility
for a legacy of civil and individual harm.
Release from Moral Responsibility
Ethical issues arise under
the reigning higher education service paradigm – a functionary triad of
institutions (university/college), governments and unions. Each enjoying a form of moral agency, these
functionaries are severally or jointly subject to ethical analysis. An incomplete account of the analysis identifies
issues such as access limited by ethnicity and economic status, scarcity of
employment, exploitation of labour, and service of dubious quality.
These are serious charges in
any civil enterprise, but perhaps especially in higher education.
However, there are mitigating
circumstances. As things stand now use
of the triad paradigm is not election among evils, as though there were
available alternative service paradigms each of which has been proven a less
suitable candidate. There are no other
candidates, no other possibilities, only variation on this iconic theme.
Consequently any ethical
analysis that occurs does so from within the solitary, unavoidable, and necessary
conditions scribed by triad higher education. With the scope of moral responsibility so qualified, any variation on
the theme, failure to choose the lesser evil or use due diligence in the
election process are acts subject to censure, but the theme itself is outside the
scope of ethics.
By analogy if the only possible
form of governance is divine rule, then it would be impossible to assess it on
ethical criteria. If circumstances of
governance cannot be any other, then there is no moral dilemma regarding the
use of such rule, only relative aspects of its implementation under conditions
necessary to the form.
None of this excuses the
routinely inappropriate election among evils we suffer and lament as
participants in higher education. But it
does put them in perspective, as the consequence of the necessary,
irreplaceable, singular triad service paradigm.
We can work for better
conditions from within or hope for an alternative that can improve matters from
without, but we cannot hold the triad morally responsible for the current
conditions. After all, it is not
possible for them to be any other way.
Possible Alternatives Reinstate Moral Responsibility
When functionaries devised to
serve the ends of a civil enterprise such as higher education have persistent, serious
negative impact on society, are no longer practical, or diminish in relevance
and value – all of which is true of the triad – then corrective action must be
taken. This seems obvious.
But Kant insists that the obligation
to alter such circumstances exists only if it is in fact possible for the circumstances
to be other than they are. In this case,
only if it is possible to replace the triad.
So far the case for triad absolution
has been based on the assumption that there is no other way to provide higher
education and research. This is a
ubiquitous, entrenched and fortunately, false assumption.
In fact there are at least
two other service paradigms that might be used to provide higher education and
research: the professional and the cooperative. Both are vastly superior to the triad on all metrics important to the
civil enterprise.
Because the conditions of
higher education are so abysmal, we have always been compelled to improve them
- if only it were possible. The
professional and cooperative paradigms are possible candidates that allow
us to honour this moral responsibility beyond mere variation on a defunct theme of election among evils.
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