The first installment of this three-part series presents reasons to be cautious in forming higher education (HE) internationalization relationships with China. Much of the evidence is based on my seven years of living in China, while studying its (higher) education system, teaching at levels from middle school to university, owning a private education business, and hosting 100s of hours of Philosophy Club (an open face-to-face forum for philosophical discussion of myriad topics raised by attendees). In a nutshell, the reasons for recommending caution are that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not subscribe to fundamental values which instruct HE pedagogy and policy in the West – e.g., Anglo-American, European, and Australian. These differences in values should not be tolerated or compromised and under the CCP there are no feasible means by which they can be changed through domestic action or international cooperation. Part one also presents the PSA model as a way for the West to reduce the current substantial reliance on HE export to China and thereby escape the actual and potential value compromises associated with such internationalization.
To begin, Fei’s view of “cultural self-awareness” and its
relation to “harmony within diversity” is explained. This provides the basis
for exploration of his claim that China offers better instruction in harmonious
cultural integration and therefore internationalization of HE. The source for
his views is the 2015 book, Globalization and Cultural Self-Awareness,
which is a compilation of writings, speeches, and interviews during the last ten
years of his life. The conclusion is that Fei does not provide an adequate
defense against the call for caution where (HE) internationalization with China
is concerned, but rather provides further substantial grounds for caution.
[NOTES: (1) Throughout this three-part series a sidebar system
is used to indicate significant observations and issues not explored in the
post. There are many that deserve fuller treatment, but cannot be pursued in
this format. Though they are meant to enrich, the sidebars can be ignored
without detriment to the reasoning presented in the series. (2) A loose endnote
system is used to provide citations.]
From “Cultural Self-awareness” to “Harmony within Diversity”
As a philosopher, I recognize the value of truth and appreciate
how for millennia the concept has challenged our efforts to make sense of it.
This is not the place to explore the complexities of truth theories, but simply
to stipulate that truth is real, it is not relative, we don’t always have
access to all or in some cases any of it, and a proposition is true if what it
asserts is the case and false if what it asserts is not the case. This is
likely how Fei means the term and it is how most people use it – untroubled by philosophical
meditations.
According to Fei, a necessary condition for cultural self-awareness is the detection, possession, and application of truth. This should be obvious to anyone who has given even superficial thought to personal self-awareness, as for millennia we have been surrounded by prophets, philosophers, authors, artists, therapists, and mothers who tell us that self-deception obstructs acquisition of self-awareness – that is, a falsehood obstructs acquisition of knowledge. Fei says:
I call for cultural self-awareness
in the hope that we will all re-examine our own societies and cultures and
strive for a fuller understanding of them on the basis of positivist thinking
and actual facts.(pg.50)[1]
This means what I have said many
times that we must start from reality, from facts.(pg.59)[2]
The primacy of truth is embedded in his call for facts, as
it is in his more epistemological descriptions of cultural self-awareness:
Cultural self-awareness means
that those who live within a specific culture have a true understanding of it,
know where it comes from, how it developed, which its unique features are, and
how it is evolving.(pg.50)[3]
It means that those living within
a specific culture must first “know themselves,” know where they came from, how
their culture developed…(pg.43)[4]
He claims that access to such knowledge is necessary, “in
order to have more control over one’s cultural transformation, to have more
control over the cultural choices that will have to be made when adapting to
the new environment and era.”(pg.43)[5]
…every civilization should
reflect hard on its own culture so as to acquire a strong self-knowledge. This
should make people more rational and avoid senseless, impulsive, and blind
behavior.
[Thereby enabling (inter)national
relations where] “each appreciates its own best, appreciates the best in
others, all appreciate the best together for the greater harmony of all.” This
sentence embodies my ideal for the future and also points out the way to attain
it. “Appreciating the best together” includes not only one’s attitude toward
oneself but also appreciation and respect for others, and if we could really
achieve this, there would be harmony between different cultures and nations and
thus lasting “harmony within diversity.”(pg.27)[6]
This is especially important in an international arena,
since as Fei says, “culture…includes social systems and ideologies,”(pg.6)[7]
along with “…value judgments of love and hate, right and wrong, often closely
bound up with the sense of self-respect of a people or a place, which makes
culture a very sensitive issue.”(pg.7)[8]
With such sensitivity in play, conflicts are probable and Fei claims the Western approach to their avoidance or resolution has not performed well when compared to China.
It looks as if existing Western
academic theories and thinking are unable to resolve these issues. However,
Chinese traditional practices and current ethnic policies are all in line with
the logic of peaceful coexistence. We already have a direction and we have already
advanced along it. We have 50 years of experience of implementing our ethnic
policy.(pg.19)[9]
Now look at how China dealt with
the return of Hong Kong under the principle of “one country, two systems.” This
experience positively demonstrates that different social systems with their ideologies
can coexist peacefully within a single political framework, within a single
sovereign country, and by cooperating and complementing each other can produce
a common prosperity. By separating the ideological from the economic and
political…(pp.23-24)[10]
So according to Fei, harmonization among different cultures
is achievable if only we acquire cultural self-awareness through rational
reflection in the identification and appreciation of our own and the best of
each others’ cultures, all of which necessarily depends on access to the truth
about the “man-made world” of social systems, ideologies and values in each
culture – a formula developed by China, at which it excels, and from which the West
can stand to learn. The following diagram represents this hierarchical
dependency on the road from truth to harmony.
 |
| Diagram 1 |
What Fei Gets Right and What He Gets Wrong
There is nominal merit in the strategy Fei offers for (inter)national
harmonization and none in his defense of China as a partner, even preferred
leader, in (HE) internationalization.
He is correct about the essential role of truth in the
raising of (cultural) self-awareness. To the extent that one fails to access
the truth about one’s culture or character one cannot know either. This is
because truth is a necessary condition of knowledge – another of the
foundational subjects in philosophy. Without delving into the subtleties of epistemology,
it is enough to say that knowledge is defined as justified, true, belief (JTB).
The necessary conditions of JTB mean that one knows X if and only if one
believes X, one is justified in believing X, and X is true. Failure to meet any
one of these conditions is a failure to know.
Based on this conceptual analysis of knowledge, Fei is
incorrect to think that (most) citizens of China possess knowledge of their
(modern) culture and history that is sufficient to construct cultural
self-awareness which adequately guides them to ((inter)national) harmony within
diversity. He is also incorrect to assume, as he does, that in China citizens can
acquire the relevant truths and therefore knowledge that they fail to possess –
where ‘can’ is to be understood as both ability and permission. But perhaps
more importantly, he is incorrect to assume, as he does, that for the Communist
Party or (most) people of the country (the open critical pursuit of) truth is
highly valued (in the widespread construction of cultural self-awareness and
harmony).
Assuming one does possess the relevant social, historical, or cultural knowledge that is said to reveal a value system, why should we think that the cultural self-awareness to which this knowledge contributes can lead to harmony within diversity? Fei claims the road from self-awareness to harmony (i.e., levels two to five of Diagram 1) is traversed with: “appreciation of the best” and “rational thinking.” Here is how he describes the relation:
Neither accepting
indiscriminately nor blindly rejecting [the best of a culture] is a good
option. We should “appreciate” them in a rational, calm, thoughtful, and unemotional
way. After all, no civilization is perfect; all have strengths and weaknesses,
so we should be both “understanding” and “selective” toward them. That’s what I
mean by “each appreciates its own best, appreciates the best of others, all
appreciate the best together, to build greater harmony for all.”(pg.34)[11]
His notion of best-of appreciation is the focus of the first
half of this section, with transition to discussion of rational thinking
(including JTB and level 1 (Truth) of Diagram 1) in the second half. Once
completed it will be clear that Fei fails to either provide a useful strategy
for harmonious (HE) internationalization or make a persuasive case for
(Communist) China as a leader in (HE) harmonious internationalization.
Though Fei is confident his direction “points out the way to
attain” cross-cultural harmony within diversity, the navigation he offers is
more like that provided by prevailing winds than signposts, never mind GPS. In
part, this is due to a lack of clarity in the meaning and interrelatedness of
key concepts and elements of his reasoning. To demonstrate this, analysis of
the key terms “appreciates” and “best of” is required, along with how he thinks
that on the road to harmony the former can resolve disagreements among cultures
with respect to the latter.
Thus, the first necessity is for
“each to appreciate its best.” After that, to understand the cultural values of
others will require above all tolerance and a respect for the
differences.(pg.144)[12]
[1 SIDEBAR: Fei might mean by “appreciate,” “to be
fully aware or conscious of.” This brings the meaning closer to “understand,”
“recognize,” or “notice.” Though this meaning is related to the context of truth,
knowledge, and cultural self-awareness, for reasons that are made clear in this
discussion, that cannot be his meaning for “appreciate.”]
To unpack the lack of clarity in his use of terms – which
can be characterized as ambiguity or even equivocation – consider this scenario:
After complete credible critical examination of their own cultures, two groups
exchange lists of what they deem to be the “best of” their respective cultures.
The lists are compiled with objective analysis of the complete truth about
one’s culture, followed by further analysis that identifies the cultural values
embedded in those truths, and finally evaluation regarding which of those
truth-value complexes are the best. In short: Here are the facts and here are
the best cultural values that are represented in the facts. Both groups then
succeed in their efforts to properly understand the other’s list – i.e., each
side feels the other does indeed have a complete and accurate understanding of
its best-of list. Each group now has cultural self-awareness and a reciprocal
cultural other-awareness. There are no gaps in truth and no gaps in knowledge
or understanding across the cultures with respect to their proffered best-of
lists. Job done. Hand out the harmony badges.
Not quite. A vital step remains for the achievement of harmony within diversity, namely: appreciation of the items on the other’s best-of list. Those items with which the groups find consensus warrant appreciation (i.e., being grateful for or holding in high regard), but they are not of interest, since we seek harmony within heterogeneity, not harmony within homogeneity. Also not of interest are those items with which the groups differ but are indifferent and so, presumably, have little or no impact on appreciation-to-harmonization. After dividing through by the items over which there is agreement or apathy, what remains are those items that each group evaluates as not the best, perhaps even the worst, of the other culture – i.e., those items in the respective culture catalogues over which there is contradiction, resistance, disagreement, condemnation, even shock or horror. As Fei acknowledges, “Common values and beliefs bring individuals together, but it is far more complicated and difficult for different groups to find common values and ideas that allow them to collaborate and mix.” (pg.37)[13]
If this is true, then in – “each appreciates its own best,
appreciates the best in others” – the first use of “appreciate” means “to be
grateful (not take for granted)” or “to value (regard highly)” or “grateful-high-regard”
for short, since it is a logical impossibility that some item on the list is
self-evaluated by the one culture as simultaneously the best-of and the
worst-of. But such a contradiction (i.e., A and ~A) is logically possible when
there are two cultures and one finds in the differences not the best but the
worst of the other culture (e.g., one finds disagreement, resistance,
condemnation, shock or horror). There is no more logical contradiction in this
case than there is in one person saying an artwork is sublime and a second
person saying it is silly – with more to say on this instructive art example in
due course. Because harmony is not achieved by the rules of formal logic alone,
Fei must ask us to appreciate such cross-cultural differences and in this
second use of “appreciate” he must mean to tolerate them.
So, Fei fails to clarify the two best-of selections in the
axiom of appreciation. The first is an internal selection performed by a
culture with self-awareness as it evaluates the candidates to include in its
best-of catalogue. The second is an external selection performed by a different
culture with both self and other-awareness as it evaluates the other culture’s
catalogue. Where there is agreement on the best-of selections, appreciation is
interpreted as grateful-high-regard and where there is no agreement,
appreciation is interpreted as tolerance.
But Fei now faces a rather obvious problem. As part one of this series argued, tolerance has limits. From a Western
perspective, one category of those limits is violation of universal human
rights – a Western produced and prized value system that has a paltry presence
in China to date.[14-15] Take as example a highly patriarchal culture that principally
values women as property, while another culture values them as individuals who
possess equal status to that of men, not mares. The latter would not call the
women-as-chattel value the best of another culture, nor could they appreciate
it in either sense of the term – i.e., grateful-high-regard or tolerance. But
also, the misogynist culture would consider women-as-chattel to be one of their
best values, to be appreciated with no need for tolerance.
As another example of tolerance limits, the cultures of Britain, Germany, and China share many points of agreement among values – beauty, health, children, personal safety, prosperity, clean environment, and education, to name a few – but where Democratic Britain, Nazi Germany, and Communist China are concerned there are many (fundamental) divergences regarding other cultural values itemized in their respective self-evaluated best-of catalogues – universal human rights, genocide, free press, democracy, government accountability, and academic freedom, to name a few. Depending on the context, these points of divergence approach or exceed the limits of tolerance. For instance, as was argued in part one of this series, though all three cultures share the value of education, from the perspective of the Western (higher education) value system, the absence of academic freedom in Nazi Germany or Communist China should not be tolerated or enabled by acts of complicity exercised in the name of internationalization.
[3 SIDEBAR: It
is no defence to falsely or deceptively claim that Communist China is a
democracy or that it is a champion of human rights – though both claims are
routinely made by the CCP with tragic, manipulative, and insulting consequences.{16-18]
Later in this and the third post, such deception is directly addressed. For
now, consider these analyses of the CCP’s so-called “whole-process democracy” (全过程民主, 全过程的民主) and judge for
yourself if China is a democracy worthy of the name:[19-20]]
A call from Fei for adherence to an axiom of appreciation-toleration
fails to address clear and borderline cases that exceed the limits of tolerance
and need to be resolved in order to continue down the road to harmony within diversity. With greater specificity, the error seems to be thinking
that the avoidance of intolerance (when acquiring self and other-awareness)
implies tolerance (when evaluating self and other best-of lists) – much like it
would be an error to take the absence of hatred to imply the presence of like
or love. Without some guidance on how to resolve such value conflicts we
are left adrift on the cultural winds, struggling “to build greater harmony for
all.” And it is naïve, even dangerous, to claim that such a serious impediment
to harmonious internationalization is resolved by finding “the beauty [and ignoring, tolerating, or embracing the horror] in
[fundamental] differences, so that there is a genuine, heartfelt admiration,
understanding, and empathy for [the contradictory, condemnable, contemptable,
shocking values of] others.”(pg.57)[21]
 |
| Diagram 2 |
In response, Fei,
Yang, Guo[22] and others insist that common cross-cultural values are not to be
dismissed as irrelevant to harmony within diversity, since they serve as a
starting point from which values that differ can through dialogue come to be reconciled,
tolerated, accepted, embraced, or even adopted by others – in other words, they
can help construct the resolution bridge. While true in some cases, this series
makes it clear that there are fundamental differences (between (Communist)
China and the West) that affect other values through their hierarchical dependence,
internal consistency, and technical manifestation, such that if the fundamental
values are not shared, then there is little to no room to harmonize across an
array of interwoven values. In fact, Yang and Guo ultimately concede this when commenting
on the literature regarding the dynamic between the (in)compatible values of
cultures:
The idea [of multiculturalism]
spotlights ways in which people can move beyond tolerance of difference to
reimagining, appreciating, and learning from it. Although much has been
achieved, the literature has an unsettled quality (Hansen, 2010). While
researchers are correct to point out the necessity to become open reflectively
to new persons, ideas, values, and practices (Hansen, 2014), such good will is
difficult to practice in reality without seriously modifying the way we are
educated to think cross-culturally and about cultures. For decades, a number of
people with breadth of vision and noble aspirations have made efforts in
promoting dialogue between civilizations (see, e.g., Hayhoe & Pan, 2001;
Segesvary, 2004), with active participation by supranational organizations such
as the UNESCO (d’Orville, 2012). Once again, the effect has been limited. One
explanation is that simply bringing together different people is a necessary
yet only initial step. It needs to be followed by something much more real and
substantial, that is, the internalization of values of different civilizations
within one person. Until this happens, true dialogue may not commence. In
consideration of the current asymmetries in global knowledge and values, hopes
are slim. Therefore, we cannot stress enough the need for and significance of
fostering a bi/multi-cultural identity in the global era, as exemplified by Fei
Xiaotong as a person and as a scholar.(pg.551)[23]
As indicated, Fei’s path to harmonization presents serious navigational
difficulties with respect to the key step of appreciation-toleration or, as Yang
and Guo state with greater force, “the internalization of values of
different civilizations within one person”: There is a conspicuous lack of
clarity and guidance when the appreciation or internalization involves (fundamental)
value contradictions, where no amount of cross-cultural dialogue or education
is likely to produce tolerance or adoption of condemnable,
contemptable, shocking or horrifying values – even if such educated dialogue
should prove to be useful in understanding or eliminating some value contradictions. Considering that psychotherapist offices are packed with cases of cognitive dissonance,
this deficiency is no minor impediment to harmonization within diversity
– think of a homosexual community that is educated to appreciate-tolerate or
internalize as a value the religious, social, or legal condemnation of homosexuality.
Combining these two
points, Jewish people might have a comprehensive understanding of the value
that Nazis place on the Final Solution, but that can hardly be expected to lead
them to appreciate, tolerate, embrace, internalize, admire, or find beauty in
their own horrifying destruction; and though both parties might share the
fundamental value of human life, this does not mean they agree on what qualifies
as a human (or in the case of the Final Solution the (un)just killing of a human)
– though they might concur that if X is human and if X is innocent, then some
instances of killing are just and others are unjust (or none are just). Note
that in these complexities there is a path that sends Jewish people to the
therapist office or the death camp, even though full cultural awareness and
shared fundamental values are in effect.
Continuing to flesh
out the depth of navigation failure, consider further the pinch point of
selection and resolution in the understand-select-resolve complex represented by
Levels 2 through 4 of Diagram 2. The value subscriptions found in
cultural catalogues are remarkably rich: “I really value honesty in a
relationship;” “One of our greatest values is familial piety;” “I value knowledge;”
“We place equal value on the lives of all animals;” or “One of our cherished
values is freedom of expression.” Such subscriptions are (very often) formed
and informed by asking a question that invites argumentation, namely: “Why should
I/we/you value X?” This is acutely apparent when the question is introspectively
or cross-culturally used to analyze, evaluate, challenge, or promote (best-of) value
subscriptions – not merely to discover them.
In the context of this discussion, I agree that as responses to the (critical) question, “Why should I/we/you value X?”, it is inappropriate to offer: “X is a traditional value in my family/village/country/etc.” or “Valuing X makes me feel good/confident/relaxed/self-fulfilled/etc.” or “X is a value backed by my beliefs (though they are false).” From the point of view of a philosopher, these responses are inappropriate because they are used in arguments that commit the relevance fallacies of appeal to tradition and emotion or rely on false premises; and so, they fail to provide appropriate grounds to accept, tolerate, embrace, or internalize some conflicting value that is evaluated to be the worst-of a culture.
Now, by sidestepping this sort of more sophisticated analysis, Fei misses the very possibility that the value we mutually place on critical thinking in evaluation (selection) and argumentation (resolution) might not be equally valued or practiced across cultures, groups or individuals, exposing fundamental differences with respect to what counts as an argument (for valuing X, selecting it as the best-of, and promoting its toleration or internalization by others). Further, as material that we mutually insist upon for use in proper evaluation and argumentation, the value of reality, facts, or truth might not be (equally) shared across cultures or people that instead place greater value on (say) emotional comfort or traditional adherence and where the standards of good critical thinking are not shared or consistently and competently applied.
As examples of this
sort of disharmony look at the array of argumentation standards and practices, along
with claims and conceptions of “truth” and “knowledge” that are found in: debates
between religious apologists and Christopher Hitchens; the majority of western
scientists who are theists and the top 10% who are atheists; the ease with
which friends find fault in the person you love though you remain profoundly
blind to the faults; much that is being said with respect to identity politics;
or nations that develop governments based on personality cult rather than merit
based leadership; or the selective (dis)regard of critical thinking across
countless other value matrices related to politics, economics, biology,
sociology, relationships with nature, etc.
[4 SIDEBAR:
Many years ago, the Mormons came to my door and being a philosopher, I invited
them in for the series of free lessons they provide on their holy book. There were
six lessons to be delivered. They stopped coming after the second lesson during
which I pointed out to them that, having used the convenient index provided in
the book to look up all derivative uses of the terms “truth” and “knowledge,”
it was clear to me that the text was misusing the terms. I offered a lesson of
my own in epistemology using text references to demonstrate that this was so. I
humbly recommended that the book be edited to better reflect more conventional use
of the terms. Of course, this would result in the deletion of virtually every instance
of the terms in the text, being substituted with “belief,” “faith,” “suppose”
or modal qualifiers such as “maybe,” “perhaps,” “possibly,” “might,” and so on.
I even made them tea and cookies, but my contribution to open rational dialogue
on their religion apparently was not service enough for them to deliver me the remaining
lessons.]
This presents serious
understand-select-resolve navigation problems for Fei. First, there is
considerable difficulty moving past fundamental differences in the standards
and practices of evaluation and argumentation used to defend or promote
conflicting best-of cultural values. For instance, on the path to harmony, how is
the following fundamental value contradiction resolved: for one group a course
of action is determined based on evidence-barren faith that is non-falsifiable,
while for another group action is determined based on falsifiable evidence-based
belief, as both move to persuade the other to tolerate, embrace or adopt their
incompatible best-of values? Being subject to hierarchical dependence on this
fundamental contradiction, two value matrices are created that arrange
themselves to optimize internal consistency across an implied array of
practical manifestations. Take for example a group that values non-falsifiable
evidence-barren faith in the construction of the value they place on prayer as
a means to cure cancer or schizophrenia, if God so wills it. Supposing such a
faith-based value system were to enjoy (near) global cross-cultural
internalization, it would spell the end of the modern biomedical model of
medicine and the belief-based value matrix upon which it is based, having profound
consistency and manifestation knock-on effects. As merely a hint of these
effects, think of the ways in which scientific fields of study related to
medicine would be affected, or with greater scope, how parents and politicians might
view and attend to pain and suffering if it was seen as the will of God, or the
self and community appraisals of a father whose prayers are seen to “fail” or
“succeed” in curing his child, or some persuasive sophist who argues that, like
cancer, crime and natural disasters are diseases best cured by prayer, and so
on.
[5 SIDEBAR: Fei’s
shallow casting of selection and resolution can be further illustrated using
various axiological claims like: 1) All people are of equal value; 2) All
government should be subject to the law; 3) All government and law should be
subject to the governed (the people); 4) Strive-thrive is a basic value for all
cultures; 5) Children are a principal value in all cultures; and so on. Take
the strive-thrive value as an example. In terms of a proper analysis: First, across
and within cultures this might not be universally applied, excluding (for
example) women, blacks, non-Han, etc. because they do not warrant equal value to
that of the state, collective, or group (in power). Or consider the axiological
claim that children are a principal value in all cultures. Even if this is
true, it is possible that some cultures (primarily) hold an intrinsic while
others (primarily) hold an extrinsic value for children, and this is a
fundamental difference that substantially affects harmonization across a whole
array of values that are related through hierarchical dependence, internal
consistency, and technical manifestation.]
Turing to Fei’s claim
that (Communist) China is a superior model for harmonization, to the extent
that material characterized as reality, facts, and truth play a role in the
rational construction, evaluation and argumentation related to values, the CCP
ensures that to a significant degree citizens lack appropriate access to this
material and so lack appropriate basis for cultural self-awareness and
selection of best-of values, on the behalf of which they are ill-equipped to
offer persuasive argumentation. The Party does this in two ways – both related
to education.
In light of all this,
though Fei advocates for “the possibility of
developing a whole new educational system that would place the emphasis on
teaching for peaceful coexistence, mutual understanding, and tolerance,”(pg.10)
Yang and Guo are mistaken to claim he offers
model strategic support for their call to increase culture competency education
– though they are correct to echo him when they say that international harmony
can only be achieved by “seriously modifying the way we are educated to
think cross-culturally and about cultures”(pg.551) For my part, I moved to China to offer Critical Thinking as a modification
to CCP education, one that is needed throughout the journey to harmony within
diversity – as it is needed in the development of science, art, self, interpersonal
relationships, and more. To further elaborate this connection
between education and the understand-select-resolve complex that Fei fumbles, let
us return to conceptual analysis of “appreciation” and “awareness,” as
analyzed by Yang and Guo:
As a means, appreciating the best
in oneself and in others requires deliberate guidance and unremitting practice.
As a pedagogy, appreciation has been employed widely in teaching literature,
music, painting, and other forms of arts. …appreciation is not only an
emotional response, but also depends on the use of one’s cognitive faculties as
a way to approach emotions. Appreciation is a combination of intellectual and
emotional activities that increase awareness.
One’s knowledge of a subject is
vital to a critical appreciation of it, and one’s emotional response relies on
intellectual comparison, analysis, and criticism. Appreciation cannot be
developed without great intellectual effort. It is often true that the failure
to appreciate may be traced to a lack of understanding of the subject. The only
remedy for this is learning. The greater one’s knowledge of a subject in which
there is vital interest, the greater the degree of appreciation (Hilliker,
1934).(p549)[35]
Similar to Fei, the duo displays a significant lack of
clarity. From their analysis, “critical appreciation” (of art) appears to be
composed of two elements: intellectual elements that produce knowledge derived
from comparison, analysis, and criticism which is used to “approach” the emotional
elements in (perhaps) an interpretational, interventional, or constructional
manner – with no indication of impactful interaction in the other direction,
from the emotional to the intellectual. In this way, there is overlap between
appreciation and awareness, where the latter is given the epistemological
interpretation that Fei relies upon, namely to know, comprehend or understand
through critical collection and analysis of the truth. Having folded “intellectual
effort” along with “emotional responses” into their concept of (critical) “appreciation,”
they have also folded in an epistemological notion of “awareness.” But then two
related questions arise: 1) What does “way to approach emotions” mean? I have
offered interpretation, intervention and construction, while Yang and Guo have
offered nothing. 2) Is the relationship between awareness and appreciation one
of causality (e.g., with an increase in Samuel Clemens’ awareness there is an
increase in Mark Twain’s ability to tell good stories) or identity (e.g., with an
increase in Samuel Clemens’ awareness of X there is an increase in Mark Twain’s
awareness of X)?
These questions arise because – as is the case with Fei –
there is little to no insight into how awareness, as a product of intellectual
effort, relates to appreciation (or its emotional element) – never mind insight
into how their analysis relates to Fei’s particular use of “appreciation,”
which this post bifurcates along lines of grateful-high-regard and tolerance.
Instead, Yang and Guo only add to the confusion when they claim that, “Appreciation
is a combination of intellectual and emotional activities that increase
awareness,” which, on an epistemological analysis, amounts to saying,
“Appreciation is a combination of awareness and emotional activities that
increase awareness.”
 |
| Diagram 3 |
But more unfavorable still is that their interpretation of Fei suggests a relationship between awareness and appreciation that is inconsistent with how he sequences first the acquisition of awareness (as an act of critical analysis and comprehension) which is then (somehow) used to instruct selection (as an act of evaluation that designates best-of values) that we are then supposed to (somehow) appreciate (as an act of either grateful-high-regard or tolerance), the combination of which (somehow) instructs resolution (as an act of argumentative persuasion in times of (fundamental) value conflicts) in a causal chain that (somehow) ultimately results in harmony within diversity – the totality of which Yang and Guo somehow refer to as a “theory of cultural self-awareness.” For Fei, awareness is a necessary precondition for appreciation, not the other way around. Nor is awareness constitutive of appreciation because for Fei the two are not logically, but causally related cognitive acts. That is, the causal chain (somehow) moves from knowing to selecting to valuing to (occasional) resolving to harmonizing, each being a distinct cognitive act. All of this is so much the worse for Yang and Guo when they rely on Fei to promote wider adoption of culture competence education, in a pairing that they believe is conducive to the promotion of harmony within diversity.
Despite these deficiencies, the art education example remains
instructive. Cultures (sub-cultures or people) can offer inconsistent or
contradictory judgements about the quality of some artwork (or cultural value).
But there is a sense in which not all opinions are considered equal and that
one can be educated to make aesthetic evaluations based on objective criteria, as
one can with respect to emotional, moral and axiological evaluations. In this
way, contradictory opinions regarding the quality of an artwork (e.g., that it is
sublime and that it is silly) can be resolved through education in what counts
as the proper methodology and standards of art criticism – moving art criticism
from uninformed to informed opinion. Likewise, in an attempt to encourage,
correct, or cease the experience of emotions, psycho-social education in which
“one’s emotional response relies on intellectual comparison, analysis, and
criticism” (Yang and Guo 2020) enables us to identify emotions as
(un)desirable, (in)appropriate or (un)justified according to context – with one
of the most successful types of psychotherapy being Cognitive Behaviour Therapy
explicitly grounded in the critical thinking introduced and developed by
philosophy. As the objectivist theories of emotions, ethics and aesthetics in philosophy
illustrate, an axiological education that employs an objective criteria
approach also can be used to appropriately assess value X as objectively the
worst-of a culture. In each of these cases the elements of comprehension,
evaluation and resolution are present, where even though parties have full equal
comprehension, they differ with respect to evaluation which might be resolved
by appeal to shared objective criteria properly applied in argumentation. In
this way, the artworks of Piet Mondrian or Bada Shanren
(八大山人) are judged to be of objective high value;[36-40]
and if, as was certainly true in their time and even now, people deny they are
examples of the best of art, such conflict might be resolved through education
that (inter alia) identifies methods and standards for art criticism.
[6 SIDEBAR: Here it is important to note that education is not indoctrination, but rather requires open access to information and debate or dissent grounded in critical thinking, not dogmatism or what the CCP tragically calls, re-education.[41-50] Though these features of proper education are present in CCP classrooms and so culture, they are relatively rare because they are highly circumscribed. As stated, such constraint severely limits the ability of Chinese citizens to fully and equally complete the first step of cultural self-awareness, as Party restrictions hobble selection of values and the penultimate step of conflict resolution through critical argumentation, on the road to harmony within diversity.]
The pedagogical link between cultural values and artistic appreciation is thus found in the fact that both can be taught and that such learning requires critical thinking. This means that like the objective criteria an instructor uses to teach art appreciation or a critic uses to offer art evaluation, in the case of cultural (values) appreciation, we need access to fact-driven objective reasoning that can provide critical persuasion. In the case of CCP China, education and socialization that is infused with censorship in support of cultish politics, rampant nationalism, and deference to authority violates these conditions for cultural appreciation and self-awareness, severely limiting the ability to travel down harmony road.
As an example of this limitation, consider that even though
based on objective criteria the learned who appreciate a piece of art can
tolerate the opinion of those who find it silly or offensive, can or should the
learned tolerate the plans of those who want to deface or destroy the artwork
on this basis? Now recognize that art is one of the primary sources of cultural
construction and metamorphosis and the CCP routinely destroys and censors
artistic expression – without consultation or debate – as it persecutes and
prosecutes the artistic voices of disagreement, resistance, condemnation, shock
or horror. Take as two modern examples: the artist known as Badiucao who is
wanted by the CCP as a dissident who they claim threatens national security and
a piece of sculpture commemorating the Tiananmen Square Massacre called the
Pillar of Shame, which was removed by Hong Kong University, providing further
reason not to engage in higher education internationalization with Communist China
.[51-64] All of this cultural subtlety seems to be lost on the
socio-anthropologist Fei Xioatong, who lived through the Cultural Revolution wholesale
destruction of art and artifacts but advocates for Communist China as a leader
in harmony within diversity.
[7 SIDEBAR: In Chinese culture the two deeply prioritized values of saving face and maintaining harmony are intimately connected, with negative effect on access to truth, rational thinking, and so understanding or (cultural) self or other-awareness. Also consider how the CCP (especially under Xi Jinping, or as my wife and I call him based on his official back story, the Caveman)[65-68] have turned the Party into a cult (of personality) or religion (of state). These prevent the people of China (and to a lesser extend people in other cultures) from completely knowing (for instance) the Mao-era tragedies and atrocities or even something less dramatic like failure of the Caveman to close a deal in early 2023 with Saudi Arabia for the purchase oil in RMB. Though the CCP and through its proselytization of religious-state ignorance, the people of China consider themselves neutral parties who do not interfere in, but rather appreciate and tolerate, the internal affairs of other sovereign nations. This is of course far from the truth. According to Fei, without these types of knowledge, the cultural self-awareness necessary for the building of harmony is not attainable in China.]
Identifying imprecise clarification, insufficient explanation and superficial exploration, this analysis exposes how Fei’s strategy for harmony within diversity is deficient and how to cast the complex understand-select-resolve relationship as Fei, Yang and Guo do is not only illogical, it is irresponsible behaviour from those who should know better. Though Fei fails to explicitly address these serious deficiencies in his so-called theory as it is wielded with dubious skill by the CCP, he intuitively offers a corrective when he calls for a “consensus on human values” (i.e., Level 5 of Diagram 2):
I proposed a sentence which sums
up what I mean today by cultural awareness: “each appreciates its own best,
each appreciates the best of others, all appreciate the best together, to build
greater harmony for all.” “Each appreciates its own best” comes naturally for
scattered human groups who are often quite isolated. “Each appreciates the best
of others,” however, is an attitude toward other cultures, necessary when
groups live and work together. “All appreciate the best together, to build
greater harmony for all” means achieving a consensus on human values so that
different cultures can coexist and grow peacefully. This dynamic concept of
cultural values is an attempt to build a cross-cultural dialogue so that all
can communicate and learn from each other, to achieve that old saying “harmony
with diversity.”(pg.51)[69]
Yang and Guo echo him by calling for “a bi/multi-cultural identity in the global era” – which they
believe is “exemplified by Fei Xiaotong as a person and as a scholar.” Initially,
this chorus demands clarification, since the concept of “consensus” seems to be
ironically inconsistent with that of “dynamic” or “diversity.” Though this sort
of terminological imprecision is not surprising, what is surprising from this
triad of cultural awareness proponents is that they seem woefully unaware that
there is an obvious, long-tested, well-defended, well-integrated, and well-argued
for consensus or identity to be found in the Western notion of universal
individual human rights – a notion that has principal entailment across the democratic,
socialist and communist political spectrum, though with considerable variance in
application. As an example of such variance, the CCP has recognized through ratification
of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and its own Constitution many
universal individual human rights, though these rights are routinely violated
by the Party, with no state sanctioned provision for compensation or correction
of rights violations. Consider, for example, that with its sadly ironic title, the
Supreme People’s Court in China is not permitted to hear Constitutional
challenges to legislation, never mind rule against the interests of their CCP
overlords.[70-77] As perhaps an even more unnerving example, consider how the
CCP issued a most-wanted-list identifying eight human rights and pro-democracy
advocates, placing a $120,000 bounty on their heads. If this is not enough to
shock and horrify, consider that one of the eight is not even a citizen of
China, but of Australia, where universal individual human rights such as
freedom of association and expression are earnestly enshrined in a constitution
that establishes an independent legal system for their protection and enforcement
against government interference. For Fei, Yang and Guo to ignore or disparage the
Western universal individual human rights strategy for harmonization is either profoundly
ignorant or insincere; while an aim of this series is to expose Fei’s blatant apologist
politicism and irresponsible championing of the CCP harmonization tactics.
Already ankle deep in the waters of rational thinking, which Fei offers as a bridge between awareness and harmony – operating throughout Levels 1-5 of Diagram 2 – let us dive deeper and turn our full attention to Level 1 (Truth) and the JTB conditions of knowledge. In doing so, it will be shown that foundational ways in which Fei gets it wrong about the rational or critical pursuit of truth and knowledge under the CCP shed doubt on his claim that China serves as a superior model for (inter)national harmonization.
To repeat with greater explicitness, the principal trouble
with Fei’s CCP boast is that: 1) the truth is not as highly valued (as it is in
the West); 2) citizens do not know all that is relevant to know about the
(modern) history and culture of China; 3) citizens cannot get access to
relevant truths and therefore knowledge about this culture and history; and 4)
citizens rely on questionable justification for believing to be true the claims
that they do believe regarding this history and culture. These bold claims are
intimately related and touch on both the truth and justification conditions of
JTB – i.e., one knows X if and only if one believes X, one is justified in
believing X, and X is true – and the rational thinking skills and dispositions
necessary for the acquisition of knowledge.
As further clarification and substantiation, consider a comparison that has relevance to the question of international (higher) education cooperation with China: There are two classrooms, one in the United States and the other in China. During a civics lesson, in each classroom a student asks the following question of the teacher: “Has the government ever killed students?” In the US classroom the teacher might know the answer and provide it: “Yes, on May 4, 1970, under the authority of Governor James Rhodes, National Guard soldiers shot and killed four Kent State University students as they protested against the Vietnam War and President Nixon’s broken promise to end the war once elected.” If the US teacher does not know the answer, then the question creates a learning opportunity, where students break into groups and begin internet research that quickly reveals the Kent State University incident and other examples.[78] In either case the students are encouraged to develop the disposition to seek the truth (answer) and given the critical thinking (research) skills to do so.
In the China classroom, things are precisely the opposite: 1) The teacher might know the answer – “Yes, in 1989 during pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, under the authority of the paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, Chinese military shot and killed anywhere from 100s to 1,000s of students and other unarmed civilians” – but out of loyalty to or fear of the CCP, the teacher would never dream of providing the answer, while the student is chastised for asking the question.[79] 2) If the Chinese teacher does not know the answer this will not create a learning opportunity for two reasons: a) out of loyalty to or fear of the CCP, the teacher would never dream of encouraging students to seek truths that (might) criticize the Party and b) the teacher knows such encouragement is pointless since the CCP censors this information to prevent the students from accessing such truths.
[8 SIDEBAR – These contrasting classroom scenarios are
not meant to be exhaustive. For instance, the US teacher might know the answer
but, like the teacher in China, withholds the truth out of loyalty, fear, or
some other disposition or belief. However, the point remains the same: The
information, freedom, and intellectual attributes are readily available to
challenge or correct the teacher; while this is not so in Communist China. In
fact, the information was openly available to all US citizens at the time of
the Kent State University shootings, because as a consequence of freedom of the
press the event was broadcasted on all forms of major media, making this event
an instantaneous historical fact of the culture and so citizen cultural self-awareness.
Compare this to the recent flooding in Zhuozhou and surrounding areas in Hebei
Province, where dozens, hundreds, thousands, tens-of-thousands have died. No one
knows because the CCP not only caused the deaths and destruction by opening
floodgates with little to no warning in order to save Beijing and the Caveman’s
ill-conceived pet project, Xiangon New Area, but the government shut the
internet down in those areas so that people could not post the carnage or call
for help, while the monopolistic state media literally theatrically staged scenes
of rescue efforts for publication by its army of propaganda peddlers.[80-92]]
Numerous other examples can be used such as: unnecessary
loss of life due to unreasonable continuation of the Vietnam War; unnecessary
loss of life due to unreasonable Mao Zedong policies; American enslavement of hundreds
of thousands of Africans; Sun Yet Sen and other notable generals’ enslavement
of tens of millions of Chinese citizens to opium addiction; arguments from the
separatist movement in Quebec, Canada; arguments from the independence movement
in Tibet or Taiwan; and the list goes on. Students in the US know or can pursue
and come to know the truth about all these historical events, but the Chinese
students can only know the Western events, remaining quite ignorant of their
own history. But no matter the access to the truth that contributes to the
knowledge necessary for cultural self-awareness, the US and China classrooms do
teach students a great deal about fundamental values in their respective
cultures, values that are not necessarily shared.
[9 SIDEBAR: The China examples are likely to meet
with doubt or denial by many, if not most, Chinese citizens. But in exercise of
good critical thinking, they are encouraged to examine the evidence for such
events. Of course, to do so requires the illegal use of a VPN – which should
tell one all that is needed to know about the point being made here regarding
the value of truth, access to the truth, and the justification strength of
claims made in Communist China. But more on this in due course.]
Outside the classroom, in settings like the Philosophy Club,
I have spoken to Chinese citizens about such unsavory events in China’s history
and maybe two or three in ten ever heard of them, or what is perhaps more notable
in this context, maybe more knew about them but were unwilling to openly admit
and discuss them due to concern over CCP reprisal or social conformity (such as
losing face or national piety). In either case cultural self-awareness is
hampered, while values are exposed and enforced. Inside the classroom, the
environment offers powerful means for the explicit and implicit instillation of
cultural values. In the US example, some of these values include: truth; honest
answers to questions; truth trumps political interests; truth trumps saving
face; truth trumps harmony; freedom of information; freedom to pursue the
truth; admission of ignorance; freedom of expression; encouragement to pursue
the truth; challenging authority; and government accountability. In the Chinese
example, with respect to such events in China’s history, these US classroom-conveyed
values are not shared, instead their opposites are valued.
This is not to say that on an individual or group basis
people always rise to meet the demands of critical thinking or cultural values,
any more than they always rise to the demands of moral obligations, parental
expectations, or job descriptions. This is not to say that there are no
exceptions to these cultural values found in individuals, groups, or settings.
This also is not to say that, beyond an interest in protecting their career and
personal safety, Chinese teachers do not have a responsibility to instill those
cultural values that enable students to survive and thrive in Communist China –
as their US counterparts do with respect to Western values. But the question
here is not, “To what extent are the values lived up to?”, but “What are the
values with respect to the rational pursuit of truth and knowledge (regarding
the material that contributes to cultural self-awareness)?”
In this regard the classroom serves as a rich source for analysis of the Western and Communist China cultural value systems that are used to facilitate achievement of harmony within diversity. In the Chinese classroom, and so in the Chinese culture, with respect to many relevant events that instruct values, the necessary first condition of Fei’s cultural self-awareness is not met – that is, possession of the truth. That he lived through the Mao era of Communist China and was on scant evidence branded a Rightist, persecuted, denounced, forced to make public confessions, imprisoned, banned from higher education and subjected to so-called re-education, seems not to have instilled in him an unflinching demand for truth, freedom of (dissentious) expression, or government accountability – a government that once rallied students of the Red Guard to publicly humiliate, torture, rob and murder academics such as himself.[93-101] In fact, there are times in Globalization and Cultural Self-Awareness when he speaks of these 100 years of truth and value (de)construction in just the sort of way that the CCP compels from its public figures, as part of the bargain for being allowed to safely return to or remain in the fold:
Of course, my circumstances at
the time prevented me from knowing anything about this [i.e., New
Confucianism attempts during the Cultural Revolution to transition from
traditional to modern Chinese culture] or what happened afterward.(pg.42); At
the age of 70, I resumed my research in sociology and anthropology and started
my second academic career.(pg.43); For reasons you all know, my
academic career came to a halt after 1957, and it was only 23 years later
toward the end of the 1970s and early 1980s that I resumed my work.(pg.15) [Emphasis
added.][102]
It is hard to imagine how this evasive way of speaking
demonstrates an open, honest, critical, academic disposition toward history and
politics that have done much to shape the value system of modern China under
the CCP – the nation Fei champions as a world leader in harmonization and so by
logical implication cultural self-awareness. It is hard to imagine extolling
this evasiveness, as Yang and Guo do when they claim Fei exemplifies the sort
of “bi/multi-cultural identity” that is needed in the global era.[103] It is
hard to imagine a figure like Nelson Mandela speaking in a similar glossy way
where history and politics are being examined for their impact on cultural value
self-awareness, best-of selection, and values promotion (in South Africa).
Polishing the past in the present is risky for many reasons.
In this case it seriously undermines the acquisition of truth required by
cultural self-awareness and so sheds doubt on Communist China as a beacon for
harmony within diversity. But how does the nation perform with respect to rational
justification – that is, the J in JTB?
There is good reason to doubt the justification Chinese citizens rely on when claiming to believe they possess the truth with respect to many value forming and revealing aspects of their history and culture. I always ask – “How do you know?” - whenever inside or outside the classroom a Chinese citizen makes a claim like: the Tiananmen Square Massacre did not happen; Xi Jinping is not named in the Panama Papers; poverty has been eradicated in China; citizen so-and-so is a criminal and has been properly dealt with according to the law; people in Shanghai COVID-19 lockdown are receiving adequate food and healthcare; 95% of parents are in favor of the Double Reduction education policy; China has manufactured a seven nanometer chip, and so on. Almost without variance, their answer is some version of, “The government (in one manifestation or another) has said so.” To which, in good critical thinking form, other questions naturally arise, such as: 1) How do you know the government is telling the truth? 2) Does the government have an interest in lying? 3) Are there any independent sources that corroborate the claim? 4) Are there reliable sources that contradict the claim? 5) Have you examined for yourself the evidence for and against? 6) Do you think that relying on one source for (important) information is sufficient to draw conclusions and to claim to know? 7) Do you possess a positive bias toward the nation of China that might impair your critical thinking?
At this point they usually look dumbfounded. This is so for
two possible reasons. The first is it never crosses their minds that the
government might lie to them – where dishonesty sheds doubt on the reliability
of the source and so justification for believing claims from the source. The
second is they acknowledge my questions are reasonable, but are unable to
answer them. This is because they are unpracticed in challenging the government
(or authority in general), since this is a disposition and skill that citizens
are throughout their lives conditioned not to practice and so they lack the
intellectual and material resources to do so. In either case, they cannot
believe I am openly and directly challenging the authority, reliability, or
trustworthiness of the CCP as a source for the truth; and that my behavior suggests
(inter alia) that the CCP government should be held accountable for its claims,
that the government must defend itself against authenticity challenges.
Incidentally, in China, the same analysis can be offered where the CCP is
replaced with another culturally beatified authority such as parents or
teachers or police or courts… Chinese don’t challenge authority, they navigate
it.
But surely Fei requires such open, honest, criticism of sources, if the rational pursuit of the truth is to produce justified claims to the knowledge that forms cultural self-awareness – particularly in the case of government actions, which for 100 years have exercised unfettered control over citizens from cradle to crypt, destroying, altering or hiding truths it deems incompatible with CCP interests. But again, perhaps Fei’s experience in mid-20th century China retained a strong conditioned hold on his rational thinking, since challenges to government authority or authenticity were met with public shaming, imprisonment, re-education and execution.
If I push matters farther by offering evidence that
challenges (the source of) their claims, those who hold steadfast say something
like: “This is just Western propaganda, misinformation, or fake news, meant to
humiliate, undermine, or destroy China.” Of course, it does not enter their (critical)
thinking that in this rebuttal they conflate the CCP government with the people
of China and merely parrot the very source that is being challenged – namely
the CCP propaganda machine – thereby committing the fallacies of association
and begging the question. Though I freely acknowledge that their charge of anti-China
propaganda is very likely true in some cases, it does not enter their (critical)
thinking that the West has: freedom of the press and China does not; freedom of
information and China does not; freedom of expression and China does not;
constitutionally separated judicial and legislative branches of government and
China does not; government accountability or transparency and China does not; active
protection of constitutional rights and China does not; ability to sue the
government and China does not; academic freedom and China does not; and so on.[104]
Such distinctions that are significantly relevant to assessment of the
(relative) credibility of CCP and Western sources rarely have any impact on
their justificative reasoning.
[10 SIDEBAR: This sort of selectivity in the
application of critical thinking is not unique to China. During instruction in
my university classrooms, private education business, or philosophy club, the
line that people consciously or unconsciously draw when asked to think
critically about certain deeply personal topics or people is often exposed. This
deficient way of reasoning closely resembles that of a child to a parent or a
parishioner to a priest. But it is a line that must be crossed for the proper
development of critical thinking as a tool for the acquisition of truth and
knowledge. The relevance here is that in the case of China, for many if not
most citizens, the CCP has actively and consciously set itself up as a parent
or priest not to be challenged by its charges with critical thinking. This is
not to say that there are not other doxastic states held by citizens of China,
some of whom agree with the challenges but do so secretively, some of whom
claim there is just no way to know, some of whom say there is likely truth on
both sides.]
To shed further doubt on the justification condition of Chinese
cultural self-awareness, consider that even in those rare cases where some
unsettling or embarrassing event rises to public-awareness and threatens the
state-manufactured picture of social harmony – like a woman chained to a wall
by her husband for 20 years after being sold to him by her family[105-113] –
there is very little information published and when citizens try to collect and
provide information or lend support to the tragic victim, the government
censors the information and detains the good Samaritans using “pocket laws,” with
no due process, or even notification to the detainees relations – they simply
disappear for weeks. Upon their release, these individuals invariably say
nothing of their experiences in government detention and abandon their good Samaritan
efforts. No one is justified in claiming to know what is the status of this
woman, because as a good critical thinker will tell you, under such
circumstances the only official permissible information provided by the
government is not to be relied upon, especially in a highly patriarchal society
with extreme gender inequality, where actionable protections for women are few
– protections determined and enforced by the two highest bodies of China’s
government, the Communist Party Central Committee of which only 5.5% are women and
the Politburo which is said to be the seat of party and state leaders has no
women.[114-126]
[11 SIDEBAR: So-called “pocket laws” are vaguely worded laws that can be pulled out of the government’s back pocket and used to arrest, detain, and punish those who in any way threaten CCP authority. When combined with the “social credit system,” these pocket laws – such as “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” or the latest versions of the “Counter-Espionage Law” and the “Foreign Relations Law” – are key components of the harmonization tactics used by the CCP.[126-138] Harmony within diversity, indeed. Living in China, I quickly learned that the value of harmony is best understood by asking these two questions: “Whose definition of harmony?” and “How is it achieved?” The bitter irony is that the notion of harmony borrowed from Confucius is the very cultural value that has been bastardized by successive forms of rule in China and used as an excuse to deny access to the truth that Fei claims is necessary for cultural self-awareness that leads to harmony. But like so many of the key terms used by Fei, he fails to define what he means by harmony. In the modern context, my succinct answer to these two questions is: the CCP boot.]
This example is a minor blemish on the public image of state-constructed harmony, where thanks to its absurd narrow measure of culpability the Party loses little to no face. After all, though the CCP claims and exercises supreme authority over all citizens and levels of government and local government for many years most certainly possessed knowledge of the appalling situation, the central government did not personally chain this woman and eventually intervened to release and care for this victim, or so they claim – how can we be justified in believing this claim is true? If this is how the CCP handles a relatively minor case of remote embarrassment that is readily scapegoated to a few individuals in local government, one can only imagine the major cases that are lied about or concealed from the collective cultural archives – like the murder of students in Tiananmen Square; cannibalism during mass starvation under Mao; the man who risked everything to hang a banner protesting the CCP and Emperor Xi;[139-142] the covert tactics used to suppress democratic voices in Hong Kong; the death rate for coalminers with black lung; human trafficking in women, children, and organs; the origin and death toll of the COVID-19 virus; the state execution rate; the cultural and environmental effects of the Three Gorges Dam; the national unemployment and GPD growth figures; the fate of student activists in the white paper protests against Zero-COVID policies; the net worth of Politburo members and their families;[143-148] to name but a few.
[12 SIDEBAR: For yet another telling reason not to engage in HE internationalization with China’s HEIs, consider that in the aftermath of the white paper protests dozens of western universities and tens-of-thousands of faculty and students – most of which stand to lose by offending the sensitive CCP – have called for information on and the release of student protestors, while Chinese universities have not, but instead have increased policing, surveillance, intimidation, and coercion of their students.]
In all of this, there is good reason to think that the complete
truth about (modern) China is not known by citizens and that they lack
justification for many of the claims that they believe to be true. But worse
than that, (Communist) China lacks the sociopolitical tools and temperament to
support actions that either correct this ignorance through open critical pursuit
and promotion of the truth or through effective participation in cultural
values construction. Citizens remain pupils in a CCP classroom.
Fei got it correct when he said truth and rational thinking are needed for (cultural self and other) awareness. He also got is correct when he said a consensus on values was needed to arrive at harmony within diversity. But there is much that cannot be praised. He was incorrect to think that citizens of (Communist) China possess adequate cultural self and other-awareness to lead the way to harmony within diversity. He was incorrect to think that the West can acquire cultural other-awareness of China, which surely is needed for effective cross-cultural dialogue on the road the international harmony. He was incorrect to think that tolerance was either (somehow) necessary for awareness or (somehow) useful in resolving cross-cultural values that fundamentally conflict. He was remiss in not offering and exploring value candidates for consensus, while he overlooked viable ones which he intimated – i.e., truth and rational thinking or universal individual human rights. He seems ignorant of the fact that his axiom of appreciation does not mean there are no proffered best-of values that are in fact the worst-of, it does not mean that there is beauty in Nazi values regarding the Jewish peoples, it does not mean that appreciation necessitates tolerance or acceptance, it does not mean that awareness necessitates appreciation, and it does not mean that all value conflicts can be resolved with awareness and appreciation. And as we shall soon see, he was incorrect to think that (Communist) China exemplifies diversity or harmony.
[13 SIDEBAR: It should come as no surprise that without
hesitation I table critical thinking and truth as a pair of candidates for
cross-cultural consensus on values that is superordinate to that even of
universal individual human rights – though I estimate that this trio improves
the chances of achieving harmony within diversity.]
This section dwelt on negative aspects of Communist China,
but of course knowing the worst-of is necessary for knowing the best-of. Looking
at the worst-of, it is difficult to accept Communist China is an exemplar of
harmony within diversity when the nation – that is, the CCP and the largely complicit
citizenry – places truth and justification in such a precarious position and
where, as a champion of the Chinese harmonization model, Fei is as careless with
his employment of key concepts as he is with his selection of cultural truths.
Harmonious Diversity in China and the West
Though the previous section provides sufficient reasons to think Fei’s defense of Communist China as an ideal model for harmonious diversity lacks merit, some time should be spent in direct response to his claims that the nation is culturally diverse and that the Western approach to achieving harmony is inferior to the Chinese.
With respect to diversity, Fei points to the 56 ethnic
groups within China. My knowledge of these groups is nominal, so I cannot speak
to the distinctness of one from the other in terms of cultural values. I also
lack sufficient knowledge regarding CCP policy and practice to comment conclusively
on national harmonization of the ethnic minorities – which Fei claims China has
50 years of experience of implementing with success. However, if experience
with diversity as a condition of successful harmonization is measured by the numbers,
then China is a relative amateur compared to Western nations. Against the
dominant Han, the remaining 55 ethnicities in China amount to a little over 8%
of 1.4 billion people. Based on the 2021 census, with over 450, Canada has more
than eight times the number of ethnocultural groups in a total population of 37
million. The ethnocultural and racial profiles of Canada are shown in the
following table:[158-161]
Another measure of the experience Communist China has with diversity is in its immigration data. According to its 2020 census there are 845,697 foreigners in China, of whom virtually all are on temporary residency permit visas that typically require annual renewal. From 1986 to 2013 the number of immigrants issued permanent residency was 7390, with other sources claiming 10,000 between 2004-2016; while as of 2010 there were 1448 foreigners issued citizenship. With tough immigration policies that primarily seek high-end talent for nation building, denial of dual citizenship, and extensive foreigner surveillance such as limitations on the hotels that are allowed to accept foreign guests and required residency or hotel registration police reporting, it is not surprising that the numbers are so low.[152-157] For comparison, according to the 2021 census, 23% of the Canadian population is represented by those who were, or have been, a permanent resident or landed immigrant. The following table shows immigration trends for Canada:[158-161]
For instance, Confucius says: “do
not do to others what you do not wish done to you” with the emphasis on one’s
self “not doing” instead of demanding that others “do”; then, there are
proverbs and sayings such as “cultivate yourself, do not blame others” and
“take a step back and the sky opens up” which all advocate self-restraint,
forbearance, and humility. These qualities make up a distinctive Chinese
philosophy of life, formed over generations of many people living together
within an integrated whole.(pg.34)[171]
From ancient times down to the
present, Confucian Analects have been respected as the words of a sage, which
means that his precepts for human interactions are fully accepted by most. These
ideas can continue to have a positive effect in modern society. The precepts
“put oneself in another’s position,” “do not do to others what you do not wish
done to you,” and “treat others’ elderly with reverence as I treat my own,
treat others’ children with kindness as I treat my own” build mutual respect, tolerance,
restraint, and shared benefit so that cooperation is possible. People bound
together by ethics and morality are very stable, which is why we say “using
virtue to practice benevolence” is most effective. I believe these experiences
of Chinese history and culture can provide valuable food for thought as we try
to build a new peaceful order in the twenty-first century.(pg.53)[172]
It should be noted that the rise of Confucian philosophy was
a response to the Spring and Autumn (770-476 BCE) and the Warring States
(475-221 BCE) periods of Chinese history, which can hardly be described as
examples of an integrated whole. In fact, Chinese history is a tidal shore of
integration and disintegration right up to the war lords of the 20th
century that emerged when the last dynasty collapsed – a dynasty founded by a Manchurian
nation of 500,000 people that managed, with extensive help from Chinese people,
to slaughter around half of China’s 120 million souls in establishing the Qing
dynasty.[173-174] But never mind what Fei might mean by generations of
integration, the sagacity evidence he points to is certainly nothing that can
be called “distinctive Chinese philosophy.” For instance, the ancient Greek
philosophers, contemporaneously and originally spoke in similar ways regarding
values, morals, and perspectives – not to mention the coverage offered by Western
religion and fiction.
No, what is of interest here is the conspicuous absence of any Chinese versions of Augustine, Abelard, Galileo, Bacon, Voltaire, Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Darwin, or Marx, to name but a few from the Anglo-European tradition of the West and who are primarily classified as philosophers or scientists. Along with comparable literary, religious, and social activist examples, such thinkers are crucial to the development of Western cultural values, the most notable of which in this context is the use of rational thinking to challenge and adjust the established order – being just the sort of approach required for reliable access to the truth and cultural self-awareness that can secure (inter)national harmony within diversity. If comparable culture-clastic Chinese thinkers exist, are they widely celebrated and taught in China’s schools? Are they included among the CCP’s Great Books of the Eastern World? Or with more direct import to the discussion, if they do exist, why did Fei not rely on them in his grasp for historical intellectual evidence that supports China’s alleged talent for conceiving and directing the path from truth to harmony?
Moving from the abstract to the concrete, acknowledging the
challenges to harmonization posed by (radically) different cultural values, recall
that Fei says a “consensus on human values”(pg.51) is needed, then notice how he
gestures, not east, but West for examples.
North America provides a testing
ground for integration of different immigrant cultures. In the United States
and Canada, there is a very strong sense of common values encompassing the
whole of society, yet beneath there is also an undeniable diversity. So
cultural commonality and diversity exist and develop in tandem in the course of
modernization.(pg.8)[175]
Pointing to the West, he conspicuously steps over the spring for such common values – long developed and fought for universal individual human rights. The concept of human rights has roots in Greek philosophy, but notable early expression is also found in the Magna Carta (1215). This document has no correlate in Imperial Chinese history, while the CCP forbid its open display (at universities) during its 800th anniversary global tour.[176-181] As the Magna Carta established and expanded rights in the earlier 13th century, its modern descendants are documents such as the American Constitution or the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. Though China has ratified several international human rights declarations and has its own Constitution, these documents seem to have little to no effect on its harmonization practices or the cultural values of Chinese citizens, none of whom are emboldened by exercise of their Constitutional rights in the face of repeated government violations – never mind being inspired to defend the Constitution by creating YouKu (优酷) or Douyin (抖音) channels devoted to auditing the auditors!
This highlights a fundamental difference between the West
and China that instructs their respective notions and methods of harmonization.
For while collectivism strains the human rights model for harmonization
championed by the West, the collectivistic valuation of humans is perfectly
compatible with tyranny. To suggest that subordination of the individual to the
familial or national collective equips Communist China better to resolve conflicts
of cultural values seems deeply misguided – especially in a country where one
of its Supreme Court functions is not hearing Constitutional challenges to
legislation or its enforcement by the government, but the rubberstamp review of
death penalty cases that are a state secret and estimated to occur on a scale
that makes the US look like an amateur.[188-191]
From limited ethnicity to nominal immigration, from shared Western
philosophies to cyclical Chinese disintegration, from ratification of human
rights to veneration of collectivism, all of this is very serious oversight by
a renowned socio-anthropologist in defense of Communist China as a leader in
harmonization.
[14 SIDEBAR: My in-country experience and limited
knowledge of Chinese history suggest to me that this collectivist-individualist
distinction is not what it seems to be.]
Continuing the comparison to a Western-based human rights harmonization
tack, within the diversity the country does possess, let us look briefly at two
examples of the exercise of the superior harmonization skills Fei attributes to
Communist China – the Uyghurs and Hong Kong. The Uyghurs are one of the
recognized ethnocultural groups with a population of just over 10 million, the
vast majority of whom are located within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
This group practices the world-wide organized religion of Islam, presenting a
pronounced contrast in cultural values where 90% of China’s population consider
themselves atheist or non-religious.[192]
There is evidence that at least since 2017 the CCP has been conducting an ongoing persecution and prosecution campaign against the Uyghurs that includes: torture, rape, execution, forced labor, false imprisonment, forced “re-education,” property confiscation, harassment of numerous kinds, and more. Though the corroborating evidence is mounting, it remains a challenge to conclusively substantiate all the charges of human rights violations – rights that are articulated in the Chinese Constitution and international documents ratified by China. This is because the CCP refuses to cooperate with independent global organizations that request investigative access to the region. Instead, the Party responds with propaganda and secrecy, describing the affair as an internal, not an international concern – in other words, mind your own business, as though human rights were not the business of all global citizens who aim for a more harmonious world.[193-226]
[15 SIDEBAR: Religion is not considered here though
it too is telling of Communist China inexperience and intolerance when it comes
to diversity. In fact, though China’s Constitution itemizes freedom of
religion, the CCP has actively and sometimes brutally undermined exercise of
that freedom at every turn, with the latest turn being the treatment religion
receives under the new Counter-Espionage Law, in a country where clergy of the
only five recognized religions that are reputedly protected under the
Constitution – Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism – were
already required to pledge allegiance to the CCP and socialism and to “resist
illegal religious activities and religious extremist ideology, and resist
infiltration by foreign forces using religion.” The CCP has long infiltrated
religious organizations and undertaken overt and covert campaigns to coerce or
threaten adjustment to their teachings in order to bring them more in line with
CCP ideology. The CCP’s persecution of Falun Gong members since the 1990s
provides a textbook example of the sort of harmony within diversity Fei
champions, where government propaganda left citizens ignorant of the truth,
suspicious and fearful of religion, and blindly grateful to a government that
created this divisive atmosphere solely for maintenance of its power.[227-234] By
comparison, 68% of Canada’s population claims religious affiliation,
represented by at least six different religions and protected by a substantial
body of legislation and case law that reaches all the way to the Supreme Court
of Canada.[235-238] It is possible to argue that the “religion” of (modern) China is an
unwavering, unassailable reverence for its history – this is the sacred. As
such, the CCP cloaks itself in this “cultural religion” to validate its
tyranny. Historically, the West has displayed a reluctance – though also a
struggle – to criticize the divine proposition (or its priestly purveyors), a
reluctance shared by Chinese people and government with respect to the
honored/remarkable/imperial history of civilization. There is also an analogy
between the long-recorded history of China and the Bible, as texts that can be
used to prove just about any set of contradictory or inconsistent claims – see part
three for a discussion of this.]
Initially, Hong Kong was less cloaked in the cloud of CCP censorship, surveillance, secrecy, and propaganda, since remnants of free press, association, mobility, expression, and democracy still had roots in the recently relinquished British territory – an historical fact that the CCP has mandated be erased from education textbooks which now must claim Hong Kong was never ceded to Britain.[239-242] Even before the Umbrella Protests of 2014 the CCP was undermining the so-called “one government, two systems” policy offered by Fei as a model for harmonization.[243] When the million-plus Hong Kongese made their way to the streets in the protest of 2019, all pretense to harmony within diversity was abandoned, as Beijing responded with the sword of militant force and the pen of regulatory might which has not let up even four years later – in stark contradiction to their self-praised harmonization policy of two within one.[244-264] In the first protest since the CCP harmonization boot came stomping down in Hong Kong, in March of this year a protest was held against a proposed land reclamation. A relatively insignificant subject when compared to protests against the human rights violations of millions of people trying to make their voices heard. This time around, the protestors had to apply to the CCP’s puppet Hong Kong government for permission, they were limited to 100, they were pre-screened by authorities, and had to wear numbers, while all materials and chants were preapproved by authorities, and the participants were not allowed to speak to reporters. This shinning display of the sort of CCP-style openness, tolerance, awareness, and conflict resolution necessary for harmony within diversity was over in one hour.[265-267]
[16 SIDEBAR: It is worth comparing how Canada continues
to deal with Quebec separatism versus to how the CCP deals with, not even the
separation or cession of Hong Kong from the PRC, but a call for basic human
rights that are in fact ratified in the Constitution of the People’s Republic
of China. The province of Quebec has been a continuous part of Canada since
1867, while for 156 years Hong Kong was a British colony, then dependent territory,
ending in 1997 with its return to the PRC. As a quick contrast, in 1980 and
again in 1995, the provincial government of Quebec held two referendums asking
residents if they want to separate from Canada to form an independent state and
the federal government has asked the Supreme Court of Canada to rule on whether
such a separation is legal under the Canadian Constitution or international law
– incidentally, the SCC answer was no, but that if the people of the province
voted in favour then federal government would have to in good faith bargain for
such a separation. Contrast all of this with China’s harmonization threat to
take by force Taiwan, which has been independently evolving for as long as New
China has been a nation.[271-278] The First Nations in Canada is another notable
comparison, offering a real example of how “one country, two governments” is
developed over time. Though the process of establishing self-governance is not
complete, there exist various legally binding agreements between the government
of Canada and the indigenous peoples that establish for First Nations
self-governing authority over land claims, natural resources, education, tax
collection, policing, and more – which incidentally, have all been made
possible due to Canada’s commitment to honor the various human rights documents
(e.g., the Canadian Constitution and the UN Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples) it has ratified and the rule of domestic and international
law as separate from legislative government (i.e., the First Nations have
repeated and often successfully sued the federal government of Canada).[279-285]
This is not to say that the various governments and peoples of Canada have
always behaved admirably or legally with respect to these internal relations
among diverse groups. The point of these examples is to show how a Western,
non-autocratic nation has extensive experience with and the appropriate tools
for establishment of harmony within diversity. In contrast, the CCP lacks both.
The point of these examples is to show how leaders on opposing sides of these
often-contentious disagreements have come to be known and even respected in the
wider cultural consciousness, being discussed in living rooms and classrooms. In
contrast, within and without its borders the CCP actively creates barriers to
the emergence, acknowledgement or celebration of an MLK, Abelard, Tubman, Ali
Ferzat,[286-288] Jacob Riis, Thelma Chalifoux[289] or Ai Weiwei[290] leaving it
in a game of catch-up with the West in terms of understanding, negotiating or
achieving equality and inclusion across many harmonizing institutions and
values that have been openly and critically grappled with throughout Western
history. All of this and more Fei should have known, though I would not be
surprised if he did not. But if he did then his dismissal of the West and
defense of Communist China as a leader in harmonization strikes me as
shamefully insincere.]
As Fei was dead by the time these events occurred, perhaps we can forgive him the bitter irony his own examples present. But were he alive and able to access the truth of these examples, somehow, I think the realities would not have altered his opinion regarding Communist China as a model for harmony. After all, he willfully ignored or glossed contrary (historical) evidence which he lived through during Mao and Deng, and with weak effect reached back in the reputed 6,000-year history of Chinese civilization to identify a total of 1,546 years in which he claims diversity was a value sought by long departed dynasties.
Historically speaking, Chinese
culture has demonstrated great inclusiveness, but not in all periods. The
fullest manifestation of this quality occurred at certain historical times, the
most notable being the Period of Spring and Autumn and Warring States Period
(770–221 BC) and the Han (206 BC–AD 220), Sui (581–618), and Tang (618–907)
dynasties, when inclusiveness was at its height. From this we can conclude that
the finest cultural characteristics are strongest when the nation too is
strong. We have every reason to believe that, in the new century, China will enter
a period of national strength and wealth, so we should also realize that a new
historical opportunity is appearing for those who will live in this period to
give full play to the uniqueness of our culture.(pg.51)[291]
In this context, a one-to-four inclusiveness ratio is hardly
an historical reference worth highlighting and one that can likely be found in the
history of Western civilizations. Instead, it is far more important to focus on
China’s recent history and his own use of the Uyghurs and Hong Kong, which demonstrate
that in these times of national strength the Communist China version of harmony
within diversity is defined and achieved by the CCP boot. It is harmony by
submission not appreciation. It is harmony by tyranny not tolerance. It is
harmony by command not consensus. Fei was intimately familiar with this
characterization of the CCP brand of harmony, though this did not seem to
factor into his promotion of its strategies and tactics that today remain as
unchecked, unbalanced, and unaccommodating as they were at the founding of the
nation a mere 74 years ago.
Surely from a superior leader in harmonization we want a more consistent and current record that includes greater diversity in which tests of strife are overcome with outcomes unlike those of the Uyghurs or Hong Kong.[292] Surely the curriculum vitae presented here strongly speaks for caution in forming international relations with Communist China, never mind its emulation as a superior model for international harmony.
This is not to say that the West has a shining record of
harmony within diversity. Neither the West nor China has a record that earns
them the title of world’s greatest harmonizer and any debate over which has the
worst record is bound to be an unfruitful diversion – though in such a contest,
the absolute scale of its history and population are likely to work against China.
No, what matters are the prospects for success given the experience and tools currently
available to the West and Communist China. As Fei says,
[Though] mankind has the good
intentions and aspirations to achieve a consensus on interests and values
through increased communication, greater tolerance, and mutual learning, the
previous social and cultural barriers based on power relations have not been
eliminated, and the realities of the nation state make this integrated
“cultural arena” an unrealized ideal.(pg.143)
Part three of this series addresses Fei’s mistaken
distinctions among politics, economics, values, morals, and power, as he claims
that the real barriers to harmonization are economic and political, not
ideological, ethical or moral. This botched distinction and attribution
fundamentally misunderstands the CCP under the Caveman (Xi) and his boot
harmony. But for now, perhaps he is hinting that nation states should be
dissolved – which indeed would make for an interesting element in his own
strategy for harmonization within diversity. But then the question is forced on
him: Why champion Communist China as the nation state to lead us to stateless harmonious
integration? This series of posts has provided numerous reasons why there is
very little to suggest it could or would. Though Fei got it right about the
need for truth, cultural self and other-awareness, consensus on values, and (if
any) a power structure that effectively uses them to facilitate the
maximization of harmony within diversity, what he got wrong is his promotion of
the Chinese Communist Party (1921) and its rule over the People’s Republic of
China (1949) as a model superior to that of the West in terms of the preferred
tools and experience with their use. The respective harmonization tools of
Communist China and the West are fundamentally different because their cultural
values are fundamentally different.[293-294]
The previous section of this post addressed the shortcomings of Fei’s reasoning regarding tolerance and rationality. This section challenged his claim that China has ample experience with cultural diversity and an approach to harmonizing this diversity that is superior to that of the West. The upshot of both sections is that the realities of modern China reveal it is the sort of inexperienced nation state that offers harmony without truth, harmony without human rights, harmony without tolerance, harmony without consensus, but harmony by the boot.
Concluding Remarks
Axiology is another core subject of philosophy that, along
with truth and epistemology, reach back to the ancient Greeks, instructing a
long tradition of Western thinking up to the present. The Chinese tradition of
philosophy is suffused with axiology and seasoned with truth and epistemology. Like
most of the contrasts drawn here between the West and China, this is a
difference not in kind, but in degree. Though Western and Chinese philosophy
were both used to legitimize and reinforce the various power structures
throughout history, the West also saw far greater use and celebration of
philosophy as a tool for criticism and reform of the power structure. Since the
founding of the Chinese Communist Party this difference has become increasingly
pronounced.
The rhetoric of harmony within diversity is a favorite
slogan in CCP public relations and Fei has helped to make this illusion
possible – an illusion his personal life should have made impossible. I have
not read his academic work and after reading this 2015 publication of his
activist work, I doubt that I ever will.[295-302] I see little in his (activist)
reasoning to suggest objectivity, reliability, truth-seeking, or criticism in
his treatment of modern Communist China, which after all, is but another powerful
culture-construction element to be studied with academic rigor by
socio-anthropology. In this regard, he was (or became) a politician at best and
a propagandist at worst.[303-305] Academics in the West have also made the
shift from academic to activist – Einstein, Russell, Dawkins, and Harris, to
name a few contemporaries – but the best of them did not subordinate reliance
upon their academic expertise or rigor. If Fei is an example of the sort of
celebrated academic that the CCP produces, then this is only further reason to
be cautious in forming international higher education relationships with China.
[20 SIDEBAR: Thankfully, Fei is not the only sort of academic China has produced, but he is the sort the CCP has embraced, while someone like Guo Yuhua is the sort the Party has persecuted. A Professor of Sociology at Tsinghua University, she too studied the rural peoples of China, but remained a critic of the CCP. Another example of the sort of openly critical academic the West has, by design, come to cherish is Tsinghua University, Professor of Law, Xu Zhangrun.[306-315] Like its values, the CCP selection of academics to celebrate and castigate is yet further evidence that (higher education) internationalization with China is not recommended.]
Fei regularly speaks as though each individual member of a society exercises “control over one’s cultural transformation, control over the cultural choices that will have to be made.”(pg.43)[316] Assuming this does not display a misunderstanding of how cultural change happens, it might be a rhetorical device used to encourage his audience to participate in the initiation of change. As such, this is a petition that might have impact in the West, but as he was all too familiar with, it has little traction in Communist China. Ignoring the reference to grassroot individuals as forces for cultural change, perhaps Fei thinks only those in power need access to the truth about the culture, as they select those truths to which individuals in a society are permitted access in the manufacture of their cultivated cultural self-awareness. If so, then Communist China provides the perfect example of such a model since it not only sculpts the truth for public consumption, it does so exclusively by supressing any inconvenient truth that might arise from minority voices in the form of protest groups, artistic expression, political dissent, academic freedom, or even classroom questions. In this context, it is important to acknowledge that ignorance, intolerance, disharmony, and propaganda are difficult to overcome even where the truth is openly pursued and widely known, expressed, and debated, but the difficulty is compounded when it is not and it is obscured by those who should know better.
Part one of this series argued that there are value differences that cannot and more importantly should not be ignored on the basis of Fei’s inane, trite talk of genuine admiration, understanding, and empathy, differences that should not be tolerated or respected. Academic freedom and its denial were identified as one of them.
A significant part of academic freedom is the unfettered
pursuit and publication of truth and knowledge. From primary to tertiary
classrooms, Communist China does not share this value. In a nutshell, the
arguments presented in the previous sections show that this is a foundational
problem for the claim that China is superior to the West in terms of achieving
harmony within diversity, a problem that only suggests further reason to be caution
when it comes to higher education internationalization with the Chinese
Communist Party.
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& https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2022/12/whom-to-serve-artistic-censorship-china/
& https://www.indexoncensorship.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Whom-to-Serve-Banned-By-Beijing.pdf
& https://rehs.com/eng/2022/09/chinas-war-on-dissident-art/
& https://time.com/5634635/badiucao-chinese-dissident-artist/
& https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/06/14/chinese-embassy-protests-warsaw-exhibition-of-dissident-artist-badiucao/
& https://tvpworld.com/70458802/human-rights-are-constantly-violated-in-china-badiucao-tells-tvp-world
& https://theintercept.com/2019/06/04/badiucao-china-google/
& https://thespectator.com/book-and-art/secret-life-china-banksy-badiucao-xi-jinping/
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58847650
& https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/3160744/university-hong-kong-covers-pillar-shame-sculpture-marking-tiananmen
& https://news.sky.com/story/pillar-of-shame-university-of-hong-kong-dismantles-and-removes-tiananmen-square-statue-from-campus-12502536
& https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/23/hong-kong-university-removes-tiananmen-massacre-statue
&
[65-68] https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/14/content_16308383.htm & https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/Xi-Jinping_32.html & http://english.news.cn/20221025/97bce6c7614242f5a6e0c3ecf5e837ee/c.html & https://hongkongfp.com/2022/10/31/chinas-xi-jinping-invokes-mao-in-visit-to-cradle-of-communist-revolution/ &
[69] https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46648-3
[70-77] https://english.court.gov.cn/2015-07/16/c_769578.htm
& https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2022/04/01/more-on-supreme-peoples-court-typical-and-major-cases-or-how-typical-cases-are-tempered/
& https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2016/06/21/how-the-supreme-peoples-court-serves-major-government-strategies/
& https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/supreme-peoples-court-interpretation-on-the-application-of-the-administrative-litigation-law-of-the-p-r-c/#_Toc505790080
& https://olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/chnjudic.htm
& http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/stateStructure/2007-12/06/content_1382076.htm
& https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/about-the-supreme-peoples-court/
& http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/constitution2019/201911/1f65146fb6104dd3a2793875d19b5b29.shtml
&
[78] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKU3Yh3ksFg
[79] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kMKvxJ-Js3A
[80-92] https://chinafocus.ucsd.edu/2020/08/21/when-chinas-floodgates-open-on-its-rural-villagers/
& https://www.wionews.com/world/china-releases-flood-water-in-neighbouring-towns-to-save-capital-city-beijing-622499
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-66391331
& https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/china/deliberately-flooded-anger-grows-in-china-as-towns-serve-as-moat-to-save-beijing-articleshow.html
& https://www.reuters.com/world/china/why-was-northern-china-ravaged-by-floods-2023-08-09/
& https://www.telegraphindia.com/world/chinas-water-crisis-towns-drowned-to-save-beijing-anger-boils-up-among-public/cid/1956883
& https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/china-flood-death-toll-jumps-but-full-picture-of-damage-unclear-1.1956681
& https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/04/china/china-northeast-hebei-beijing-flooding-recovery-intl-hnk/index.html
& https://www.scmp.com/topics/xiongan-new-area
& https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/xiongan-new-area-5-years-on/
& https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/22/china-xi-xiongan-future-city/
& https://www.ft.com/content/bb01f74d-34fb-4366-930e-6ea8954401d8
& https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/04/anger-in-china-over-plan-to-use-cities-as-moat-to-save-beijing-from-floods
&
[93-101] https://wiserd.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/China_FXT_AT.pdf
(downloaded PDF in PSA-China) & https://www.laujessie.com/writing/how-the-chinese-communist-party-is-policing-the-past-to-secure-its-future
& https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53bd6ac5e4b02e963023e83c/t/53bd8c01e4b02e9630241d9a/1404931073072/9ping_en.pdf
& https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html & https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/
& https://news.stanford.edu/2019/10/29/violence-unfoldedchinas-cultural-revolution/
& http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/1966teacher.htm
& https://ccrhm.org/en/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E6%96%87%E9%9D%A9%E5%8F%97%E9%9A%BE%E8%80%85%E7%BA%AA%E5%BF%B5%E5%9B%AD-english
& http://www.chinese-memorial.org/
[102] https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46648-3
[103] Pg.551,
DOI: 10.1007/s11516-020-0026-4, (PDF)
Rethinking Cultural Competence Education in the Global Era: Insights from Fei
Xiaotong’s Theory of Cultural Self-Awareness (researchgate.net)
[104] https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/
[105-113] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/07/chained-woman-has-become-face-bride-trafficking-china
& https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/02/17/1080115082/the-mystery-of-the-chained-woman-in-china
& https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-60194080
& https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3206571/year-chinas-chained-woman-still-closely-guarded-hushed-case
& https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-08/nats-chinese-man-sentenced-for-human-trafficking/102202388
& https://www.ft.com/content/50590ab4-aef3-419d-86b6-8523341b0ded
& https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/chained-woman-04072023133620.html
& https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/mother-chained-up-video-china-tiktok-b2004247.html
& https://thechinaproject.com/2023/04/11/china-sentences-six-to-imprisonment-over-plight-of-chained-woman-of-xuzhou/
&
[114-126] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/un-says-concerned-about-lack-women-chinas-top-government-2023-05-31/
& https://www.chinausfocus.com/2022-CPC-congress/female-representation-in-the-chinese-leadership-prior-to-the-party-congress
& https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/11/07/xis-yes-men-the-absence-of-women-at-the-20th-party-congress/
& https://www.thechinastory.org/the-communist-party-of-china-where-are-the-women/
& https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2022/11/18/chinas-women-are-struggling-to-make-their-voices-heard
& https://thechinaproject.com/2022/11/29/can-women-still-hold-up-half-the-sky-in-chinas-future/
& https://www.lemonde.fr/en/china/article/2023/03/17/in-china-women-are-excluded-from-the-upper-echelons-of-power_6019777_162.html
& https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/05/25/where-are-the-women-in-chinese-politics/
& https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/22/where-are-the-women-at-the-top-of-chinese-politics
& https://www.cfr.org/blog/women-week-female-representation-regresses-china
& https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/03/07/chinas-new-state-council-what-analysts-might-have-missed/
& https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/old-faces-dominate-chinas-new-era/
&
[127-138] https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202303/21/WS64190f5ea31057c47ebb59f9.html
& https://www.law.berkeley.edu/article/picking-quarrels-casts-shadow-over-chinese-law/
& https://hongkongfp.com/2015/12/22/how-picking-quarrels-became-beijings-go-to-weapon-in-anti-dissident-lawfare/
& https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3146188/picking-quarrels-and-provoking-trouble-how-chinas-catch-all
& https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/asian-journal-of-law-and-society/article/rule-of-law-in-a-partystate-a-conceptual-interpretive-framework-of-the-constitutional-reality-of-china/95A25AD5F1E816ACB7BD46287A3E06B8
(Downloaded the paper) & https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3168986/picking-quarrels-and-provoking-trouble-should-no-longer-be
& https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1003420
& https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Picking_quarrels_and_provoking_trouble
& https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/14/business/china-data-privacy.html
& https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/viz-blog/how-chinese-citizens-see-social-credit/
& https://merics.org/en/report/what-do-young-chinese-think-about-social-credit-its-complicated
& https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/200326%20MERICS%20China%20Monitor%20What%20do%20young%20Chinese%20think%20about%20social%20credit_final.pdf
&
[139-142] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/14/we-all-saw-it-anti-xi-jinping-protest-electrifies-chinese-internet
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63238617
& https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-protests-against-xi-jinping-spread-to-many-cities-101666114416384.html
& https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing_Sitong_Bridge_protest
& See video: “Chinese Protest Banners…” &
[143-148] https://www.nchrd.org/2022/12/china-must-end-reprisals-against-protestors-investigate-urumqi-fire-free-detainees/
& https://telegra.ph/In-the-Wake-of-White-Paper-Movement-Universities-Must-Speak-Out-For-Chinese-Students-at-Risk-02-20
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64592333
& https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/26/china-free-white-paper-protesters
& https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/universities-02012023132356.html
& https://www.endangeredscholarsworldwide.net/post/increased-surveillance-and-censorship-in-universities-after-china-s-white-paper-protests
&
[149-151] https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/221026/dq221026b-eng.htm
& https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/daily-quotidien/221026/dq221026b-eng.pdf?st=HQVccgKi
(PDF) & https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/subjects-start/immigration_and_ethnocultural_diversity
[152-157] https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/china-development-transformed-migration
& https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/immigration-statistics
& https://www.iom.int/countries/china
& https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2022/number/5/article/goodbye-china-what-do-fewer-foreigners-mean-for-multinationals-and-the-chinese-economy.html
& https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379210_eng
& https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/merics_ChinaMonitor_China-Immigration_final.pdf
&
[158-161] https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/china-development-transformed-migration
& https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chinese-immigrants-united-states
& https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/immigrant-and-emigrant-populations-country-origin-and-destination?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true
& https://environicsanalytics.com/en-ca/resources/blogs/ea-blog/2022/10/26/census-2021-canadas-cultural-diversity-continues-to-increase
&
[162-163] https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2022/04/17/the-silenced-lgbtq-students-in-china/
& https://globalvoices.org/2021/07/09/china-wipes-out-lgbtq-channels-on-wechat-with-no-explanation/
[164-170] https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2019-06-18/taiwan-same-sex-marriage-law-enters-into-effect/
& https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-lgbt/in-first-for-asia-taiwan-lawmakers-back-same-sex-marriage-idUSKCN1SN0A6
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48305708
& https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/16/asia/taiwan-same-sex-adoption-marriage-equality-lgbtq-intl-hnk/index.html
& https://www.npr.org/2023/05/16/1176433353/taiwan-same-sex-adoption-rights
& https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Gender/Taiwan-recognizes-transnational-same-sex-marriage
& https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220519-forbidden-love-taiwan-s-gay-couples-seek-foreign-marriage-equality
&
[171] https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46648-3
[172] https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46648-3
[173-174] https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/86065719
(in Chinese) and https://weread.qq.com/web/reader/77c32f2071dd5af677c6556kecc32f3013eccbc87e4b62e?
(in Chinese)
[175] https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46648-3
[176-181] https://u.osu.edu/mclc/2015/10/15/magna-carta-exhibition-abruptly-moved/ & https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/chinese-activists-xi-jinping-magna-carta & https://magnacarta800th.com/articles/magna-carta-not-welcome-at-beijing-university/ & https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-magnacarta-10152015153257.html & http://www.humanrights.asia/news/forwarded-news/AHRC-FAT-041-2015/ & https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-an-introduction &
[182-187] https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/how-collective-human-rights-undermine-individual-human-rights
& https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/SR227_0.pdf
& https://sdgacademylibrary.mediaspace.kaltura.com/media/Collective+vs.+Individual+Rights/1_i593mb4w
& https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1995.tb01734.x
& https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-group/#ScepAbouGrouRigh
& https://www.jstor.org/stable/24674494
&
[188-191] https://worldcoalition.org/2022/02/15/china-death-penalty-2022/
& https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/TheRightsPractice_UPR_of_China_Mid-term_Report_November2021.pdf
& https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/capital-punishment-in-china/245520/
& https://nypost.com/2021/02/18/chinas-authoritarian-execution-system-spares-no-prisoner/
&
[193-226] ld.php (unc.edu)
(CIA Report on Detention Camps in Xinjiang) & https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/reports-and-resources/the-chinese-governments-assault-on-the-uyghurs
& https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/November_2021_Uyghur_Report.pdf
& https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019%20China%20Surveillance%20State%20Update.pdf
& https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf
& https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/ANNEX_A.pdf
(China’s response to UN report (immediate preceding link) on Uyghurs) & https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/04/china0421_web_2.pdf
& https://guides.lib.unc.edu/china_ethnic/data
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62744522
& https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/85qihtvw6e/the-faces-from-chinas-uyghur-detention-camps
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071
& https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-53463242
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53220713
& https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-53463403
& https://findit.state.gov/search?query=Uyghurs&affiliate=dos_stategov
& https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x26611
& https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/yunnan-mosque-05302023145532.html
& https://www.nchrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Persisting-in-Resisting.pdf
& https://www.ohchr.org/en/2017/11/china-un-experts-condemn-jailing-human-rights-lawyer-jiang-tianyong
& https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/china-human-rights-defenders-given-long-jail-terms-tortured-un-expert
& https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/06/un-experts-call-decisive-measures-protect-fundamental-freedoms-china
& https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100518.htm
& https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/seeing-ccp-clearly
& https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shadian_incident
(Cultural Revolution massacre of Muslims) & https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/stream/pdf/24/1.0071951/1
(Cultural Revolution massacre of Muslims) & https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html
& https://www.nchrd.org/2023/03/will-the-hui-be-silently-erased-a-groundbreaking-report-on-muslim-hui-minoritys-crisis-of-survival-amid-chinese-government-policies-aiming-to-eliminate-hui-identity/
& https://www.nchrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/CHRD-HUIF-Hui-Report-1.pdf
(A repost on CCP treatment of the Muslim Hui, which are not the Uyghurs.) &
https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/
& https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights
& https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china/report-china/
& https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/WEBPOL1056702023ENGLISH-2.pdf
& https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/china-uyghurs-living-abroad-tell-of-campaign-of-intimidation/
& https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/02/china-uyghurs-abroad-living-in-fear/
&
[227-234] https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/
& https://www.opendoorsus.org/en-US/stories/chinese-parents-religion-pledge/
& https://www.opendoorsus.org/en-US/persecution/countries/china/
& https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption/china-targets-rumors-religion-in-updated-party-rules-idUSKCN1LC0AQ?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=e919f5bce7-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_08_27_01_42&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-e919f5bce7-399904105
& https://bitterwinter.org/china-beware-of-the-new-anti-espionage-law/
& https://thechinaproject.com/2023/05/02/should-you-be-frightened-by-chinas-revision-to-the-anti-espionage-law/
& https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/new-report-trapped-china-s-expanding-use-exit-bans
& https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/441219-CHINA-2022-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf
&
[235-238] https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2021079-eng.htm
& https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2021079-eng.pdf?st=UhCM_WBP
(PDF) & https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/07/01/5-facts-about-religion-in-canada/
& https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/221026/dq221026b-eng.htm
&
[239-242] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-61810263
& https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/15/new-hong-kong-textbooks-will-claim-city-never-was-a-british-colony
& https://www.npr.org/2022/06/15/1105162914/was-hong-kong-a-colony-not-according-to-new-textbooks-a-newspaper-says
& https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hongkong-textbooks-06152022112327.html
&
[243] Pg. 23, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46648-3
[244-264] https://freedomhouse.org/article/joint-letter-chinas-national-security-law-hong-kong-will-threaten-basic-rights
& https://hongkongfp.com/john-lee/
& https://hongkongfp.com/hong-kong-national-security-law/
& https://hongkongfp.com/2023/05/03/explainer-small-chinese-language-media-outlets-spring-up-as-hong-kongs-big-names-shut-down/
& https://hongkongfp.com/2023/05/03/explainer-the-decline-of-hong-kongs-press-freedom-under-the-national-security-law/
& https://hongkongfp.com/hong-kong-25th-anniversary-of-the-handover/
& https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/01/comment-un-human-rights-office-spokesperson-liz-throssell-hong-kong-special
& https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/06/un-experts-call-decisive-measures-protect-fundamental-freedoms-china
& https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hongkong-law-06302020071359.html
& https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown
& https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong_47
& https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/16/trial-of-the-hong-kong-47-symbolises-chinas-attempts-to-dissolve-civil-society
& https://hongkongfp.com/hong-kongs-47-democrats-national-security-trial/
& https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/22/hong-kong-47-lawmakers-activists-face-unfair-trial
& https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/chinese-legislature-tightens-control-over-hong-kong-elections/
& https://qz.com/1714897/what-was-hong-kongs-umbrella-movement-about
& https://www.hrw.org/blog-feed/hong-kong-protests
& https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/07/01/hong-kong-china-crackdown-democracy/
& https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protests-explained/
& https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1709442019ENGLISH.pdf
& https://freedomhouse.org/report/policy-brief/2019/democratic-crisis-hong-kong-recommendations-policymakers
&
[265-267] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/28/asia/hong-kong-first-protest-in-years-intl-hnk/index.html
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65080083
& https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/hong-kong-first-authorized-protest-since-2020-comes-amid-worsening-crackdown-on-dissent/
&
[268-270] http://www.ali-ferzat.com/ & https://oslofreedomforum.com/speakers/ali-ferzat/
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14665113
[271-278] https://www.britannica.com/place/Canada/Quebec-separatism
& https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/separatism
& https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do
& https://www.afn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Sector-Update-Inherent-Right-to-Self-Government-June-2021-EN.pdf
& https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/timeline/the-flq-and-the-october-crisis
& https://historyofrights.ca/history/october-crisis/
& https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/10/quebec-sovereignty-polling-00086428
& https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_Crisis
&
[279-285] https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-self-government#:~:text=Indigenous%20self%2Dgovernment%20is%20the,with%20federal%20and%20provincial%20governments.
& https://fngovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Self-Governance_Right_CFNG.pdf
& https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1539869205136
& https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100032275/1529354547314
& https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/principles-principes.html
& https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/principles.pdf
& https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b4446f31-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/b4446f31-en
&
[286-288] http://www.ali-ferzat.com/
& https://oslofreedomforum.com/speakers/ali-ferzat/
& https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14665113
[289] https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1559226684295/1559226709198
[290] https://www.aiweiwei.com/about
[291] https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46648-3
[292] https://freedomhouse.org/article/gutting-hong-kongs-public-broadcaster
[293-294] https://freedomhouse.org/report/china-media-bulletin/2021/chinas-information-isolation-new-censorship-rules-transnational
& https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/16/all-the-news-unfit-to-print-what-beijing-quashed-in-2016/
&
[295-302] http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/2018/et/201806/t20180621_800133326.html
& https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202303/19/WS64165b03a31057c47ebb5435.html
& https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201403/t20140331_678150.html
& https://www.iias.asia/sites/default/files/nwl_article/2019-05/IIAS_NL60_2223.pdf
& https://china-cee.eu/2023/06/09/how-shall-we-reveal-chinese-civilization-modern-significance-in-the-comparison-of-civilizations/
& https://china-cee.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/China_Watch_Zhang-Xiping_2023_18.pdf
& https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202205/1266757.shtml
& https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3218168/chinas-pride-its-own-civilisation-and-respect-others-rooted-belief-equality
&
[303-305] https://www.readingthechinadream.com/guo-yuhua-communist-civilization.html
(extract a quote from Guo near the end of the interview that counters Fei’s
high praise of Comm China) & https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/ruling-through-ritual-interview-guo-yuhua
(contrast her with Fei’s pink propaganda) & https://chinachannel.lareviewofbooks.org/2020/03/15/cc-guo-yuhua/
[306-315] https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7312/chee19522-006/html
& https://www.readingthechinadream.com/guo-yuhua-communist-civilization.html
& https://www.readingthechinadream.com/guo-yuhua-farewell-sina-weibo.html
& https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/professor-stopped-05082023171626.html
& https://chinaheritage.net/journal/professor-guo-yuhua-on-the-poison-in-chinas-system/
& https://www.nybooks.com/online/2018/06/18/ruling-through-ritual-an-interview-with-guo-yuhua/
& https://chinaheritage.net/journal/jaccuse-tsinghua-university/
& https://chinaheritage.net/journal/and-teachers-then-they-just-do-their-thing/
& https://chinachannel.lareviewofbooks.org/2020/03/15/cc-guo-yuhua/
& https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/ruling-through-ritual-interview-guo-yuhua
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